The second angle, which is less obvious but politically more interesting, concerns the powerful symbolism conveyed yesterday to observers by the sequence of events surrounding the rescue of flight FZ1073, carrying 174 passengers, 166 of whom were Israeli, according to Israeli media. The sequence in question is not merely about what happened to the passengers, who were rescued yesterday thanks to the intervention of crew members, the other pilots on board and some Israelis who managed to subdue the co-pilot. The sequence to be observed is that concerning what happened around that aircraft, and it is a sequence that provides us with a snapshot of a new Middle East that often escapes the radar of international politics.

The sequence of events is as we know it: a low-cost airline from the UAE carrying Israelis from an Arab country to Israel, saved first and foremost by what happened on board, but around which a chain of security cooperation was set in motion involving the authorities of an Arab country, the United Arab Emirates, the Israeli security forces and the authorities of another Arab country, considered by Israel to be a safe haven, Saudi Arabia, where the aeroplane – which could have caused a massacre of Israelis – landed. In this sequence, in this snapshot, there is a part of the world that we often stubbornly refuse to see. There is a long-standing practice between Arab countries and Israel that has continued to exist even after Israel’s furious reaction to 7 October, which was demonised by much of international public opinion: the Dubai–Tel Aviv flight exists precisely because, in 2020, the Emirates normalised relations with Israel within the framework of the Abraham Accords, and the airline Flydubai launched the first commercial Dubai–Tel Aviv service on 26 November 2020, immediately following the bilateral air transport agreement between Israel and the Emirates.

The overflight of Saudi airspace also forms part of this same regional shift: a few days after the agreement between the UAE and Israel, it was Saudi Arabia – despite not yet having any bilateral agreements with Israel – that authorised flights from the UAE to Israel, at the request of the Emiratis. Today, that relationship is no longer a one-off: Flydubai continues to operate direct flights between Dubai and Tel Aviv. The breakdown of the normalisation process between Arab countries and Israel – as also revealed by internal Hamas documents made public in 2026 – was one of the driving forces behind the events of 7 October: the Iranian attempt, carried out through Hamas’s acts of terror, to provoke Israel into responding to a pogrom with such violence as to make any alliance with Israel unthinkable for any Arab country. 

Yet the Arab countries keen to strike at the Iranian ‘octopus’ in recent years have never severed ties with Israel. Documents attributed to the Hamas leadership show that Sinwar regarded Saudi normalisation as a strategic threat and, just a few days before 7 October, discussed the need for ‘exceptional action’ to thwart it; the same materials also reveal strong Iranian opposition to that process. This is demonstrated by the survival of the Abraham Accords. It is demonstrated by the uninterrupted flow of trade between the UAE and Israel, which remained essentially stable even in the years following 7 October: in 2025, trade in goods amounted to 3.209 billion dollars, compared with 3.254 billion in 2024. This is demonstrated by the fact that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan have continued to work in recent years within what the Americans call the ‘Regional Security Construct’ – a framework for regional military cooperation promoted by CENTCOM, the United States Armed Forces’ unified combatant command – which has air defence against missiles and drones as one of its cornerstones.

This is demonstrated by the fact that when, in April 2024, Iran struck Israel with missiles and drones, the UAE and Saudi Arabia contributed to the defence of the Jewish state through intelligence and radar, whilst Jordan, another Arab country, contributed with direct interception operations (and in May 2026, during the war with Iran, Israel returned the favour by sending Iron Dome batteries and Israeli personnel to the Emirates to operate them, to help Abu Dhabi defend itself against massive Iranian attacks, whilst according to an exclusive report in the Jerusalem Post on 15 September, Saudi Arabia and Israel are reportedly engaged in talks mediated by Centcom itself, to provide Riyadh with intelligence to counter the Houthi terrorists). The motives of the co-pilot in the alleged attempt to crash the aircraft remain unclear, and it is not yet certain whether the moments of terror experienced on the Dubai-Tel Aviv flight were the result of a terrorist act.

We know, however, that the safety net within which the Flydubai aircraft was able to bring its passengers to safety is a net that reflects a balance of power in the Middle East which Hamas terrorists dreamed of destroying, which Iranian-backed terrorists dreamed of sabotaging, which the agents of terror living in Tehran dreamed of bringing down, and which has now instead become a fundamental part of theinfrastructure through which, in a Middle East preparing to come to terms with an America in retreat from the world, attempts will be made in the future to curb the sponsors of terrorism and the exporters of terror. The story of the co-pilot who attempted suicide remains to be fully understood. The story of the new infrastructure capable of governing the Middle East, on the other hand, lies right before our eyes: it is a delicate, fragile but real infrastructure, destined to help a part of the world find ways to save itself from the new champions of global terror, just as it did yesterday for the passengers on flight FZ1073.

But the problem – the warning sign for Italy – is that they are now acting in unison. And this is a new development. In 2025, government bond yields rose across all eurozone countries, due to a number of factors including the announcement of Germany’s defence spending plan, which triggered a rise in Bund yields and put upward pressure on other government bonds. In this context, Italy represented a positive anomaly. Although it has a high level of public debt, it was the only country to have kept BTP yields broadly at the same level as in 2024, resulting in a narrowing of the spread. The credit for this went entirely to fiscal consolidation, which, at a critical moment, stabilised public finances by bringing the deficit down to 3.1 per cent.

In 2026, however, things are taking a different turn. The trend in Italian government bonds has mirrored that of French bonds: yields have risen by around 100 basis points over the last three months, with the spread widening by around 30 points. But whilst this trend is understandable for France – which has a deficit spiralling out of control (5.4 per cent in 2026, exceeding the forecast of 5 per cent) and debt rising to 119 per cent, with a government unable to balance the books – it is less so for Italy, which continues to pursue a ‘prudent’ fiscal policy (as Giorgetti describes it), which this year is expected to bring the deficit back below 3 per cent. So why are BTPs being affected by the French contagion?

Compared with a few years ago, when the deficit stood at 8.2 per cent, the trend in Italian debt appears more sustainable: rating agencies have upgraded the country’s credit rating, Italian banks and domestic savers have absorbed a large proportion of bond issues, and the share held by foreign investors is not particularly high. However, this greater stability is not enough to prevent contagion. Indeed, according to some analysts, it has created a vulnerability. Because with domestic investors already holding very large stakes, foreign investors have become more important as marginal buyers; however, unlike their Italian counterparts, they are more cautious and less inclined to take risks during periods of turbulence. Consequently, BTPs are sensitive to shocks originating from other major European bond markets, as is currently the case with the French market.

But what does this mean for the real economy and public finances? In last year’s Public Finance Policy Document (DPFP), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) had drawn up a number of risk scenarios with their respective macroeconomic impacts. One of these scenarios assumed tension in the financial markets, with BTP yields from 2026 to 2028 more than 100 basis points higher than in the baseline scenario. This is roughly the increase that has actually occurred compared with October 2025, when the DPFP was published. According to the MEF, this scenario of a sustained rise in interest rates would have a negative impact on growth of -0.1 percentage points of GDP in 2026, -0.5 in 2027 and -0.6 in 2028. The increase in interest expenditure under this scenario – with the cost of debt rising by 100 basis points – is quantified, according to the MEF’s latest calculations, at +0.13 per cent of GDP in 2026, +0.30 per cent in 2027 and +0.45 per cent in 2028.

The impact is not significant for this year, given that the rise in inflation and growth (from 0.6 to 1 per cent) should enable the government to keep the deficit below 3 per cent. However, if the rise in interest rates were to persist over time, interest expenditure – which was forecast at 4.2 per cent in 2027 – would rise to 4.5 per cent, and in 2028 it would increase from 4.4 to 4.9 per cent of GDP. In practice, the rise in interest expenditure would eat up the entire projected increase in the primary surplus, making it increasingly difficult to stabilise public debt.

Regardless of how the French fiscal crisis unfolds, as Guido Ascari and Riccardo Trezzi pointed out in yesterday’s edition of Il Foglio, high inflation and public deficits worldwide are ushering us into a new regime characterised by higher interest rates. It would be wise for the coalitions standing in the forthcoming general election to adapt their government programmes to this shift in the macroeconomic regime.

Luciano Capone

“Let’s put our differences aside... Hands up anyone who doesn’t have family problems,” said the stepmother

But the family saga is also playing out in the Lula household, with the son of Brazil’s current president, Fábio Luís Lula da Silva, known as ‘Lulinha’, coming under investigation for influence peddling just three days before his father’s official re-election bid, forcing the latter to promise he would not interfere with the proceedings. The case of Rafael Borges Amaral reads like a soap opera: the 26-year-old who died in 2024 from the psychological fallout after ruining himself through online gambling, and whose mother, a teacher, finally secured a presidential decree banning it nationwide after a two-year campaign. A clearly electioneering measure, given that it was announced eight days before the vote, it must be ratified by Congress within 120 days and was defended by Lula at his rallies, after football clubs had protested.

The general election in Brazil is due to take place on 4 October (with a possible run-off scheduled for 25 October), and four months before the vote, Lula also launched a refinancing programme for informal workers; four weeks earlier, he announced fuel subsidies; two weeks before, he approved a 15 per cent increase in the main support programme for poor families, meaning that, from six days before the ballot, between 15 and 20 per cent of voters will see their monthly payment rise from 114 to 132 euros. Flávio Bolsonaro, on the other hand, presented a 12-point security plan involving the construction of a military ‘wall’ along the borders, prisons modelled on those in El Salvador, chemical castration for rapists and the lowering of the age of criminal responsibility to 16, before adding another plan to create 500,000 prison places, following the Bukele model. However, the final stages of the campaign centred on Flávio’s alleged intention to strip Our Lady of Aparecida of her title as national patroness should he win the election – a claim that went viral on social media, stemming from a bill tabled in 2007 by a lawmaker close to the Bolsonaro family. “As long as I am president, no one will show disrespect to Our Lady of Aparecida,” Lula was quick to retort. “Everyone knows that I respect all religions. All of them!” replied Flávio.

It is an apparent paradox: the right-wing candidate accused of secularism and the left-wing candidate appealing to popular piety. But the Bible is the first of the three ‘Bs’ considered the core of the Bolsonaro electorate, alongside ‘Cattle’ and ‘Bullets’. ‘Bible, Cattle and Bullets’: Protestant fundamentalists, agribusiness and supporters of armed security. According to the polls, among Catholics, Lula has 48 per cent of voting intentions, compared with 29 per cent for Bolsonaro. Among evangelicals, the senator stands at 46 per cent, whilst the president trails at 27 per cent. And the figurehead for the evangelicals is, above all, Michelle.

The three Bs considered the core of Bolsonaro’s electorate: Bíblia, Boi and Bala – the Bible, cattle and bullets

It was only on 11 August that Flávio and Michelle Bolsonaro appeared together for the first time since their family feud, taking part in the filming of an election advert. “Let’s put our differences aside... ‘What family is perfect? Hands up anyone who doesn’t have family problems,’ she said at the end of the event, explaining that they had both put their differences aside in order to unite ‘for something much greater’. But a few weeks earlier, Michelle had posted two videos in which, speaking for almost half an hour, she accused Flávio of having ‘stabbed her in the back’.

“He was very rude, disrespectful and treated me badly on the phone. And I hadn’t done anything to him,” she said, adding that her stepson had also told her that she “didn’t understand anything about politics”. In short, she concluded that he had “mistreated” and “humiliated” her in party affairs, stating that she could not support the candidacy of someone who had never sought her backing. On 30 June, Michelle had also announced her resignation as chair of the women’s wing of the Liberal Party, which, after drifting through nine other political groups, eventually became the Bolsonaro party. The official reason: to devote herself to caring for her husband. However, on 9 July, she instead announced the creation of a political movement with the highly personalised name ‘Inarrestabili MB’. This movement was set to bring together people close to her, who, according to the newspaper Correio Braziliense, had expressed their disappointment at the way Flávio was centralising the party’s strategic decisions without consulting the other members of the former president’s inner circle. In short, it was a means of preserving the former first lady’s political capital and maintaining her mobilisation structure, so much so that the new platform had immediately begun with motivational posts, using clips from the film “Wonder Woman” to illustrate a message aimed at the conservative female electorate and evangelical communities.

All this had made it even harder for Flávio to win over female voters. After several failed attempts at reconciliation, Flávio published a video in July in which he apologised to Michelle and invited her to join his campaign. She eventually accepted the invitation, thereby securing the Senate candidacy for the Federal District of Brasília. Michelle’s name had also been mentioned as a possible presidential candidate until, at the end of 2025, Flávio announced that his father had asked him to stand. This is said to have strained their relationship, which deteriorated further when, in late 2025, MP André Fernandes, president of the Liberal Party of Ceará, announced his support for Ciro Gomes of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) for the post of state governor, with the aim of building an opposition front against the Workers’ Party (PT). This is an example of the more moderate image that Flávio is trying to cultivate, but Michelle had vehemently opposed it: in statements and videos published from May 2025 onwards, she had pointed out that Gomes had called her husband a ‘chicken thief’ and a ‘genocidal maniac’ during the Covid pandemic. Fernandes and Flávio had defended the agreement as a tactical decision endorsed by Jair Bolsonaro himself, and it was Flávio who had made the acrimonious phone call that led to the rift.

It should be noted that there are actually 13 candidates, but the race now appears to be centred on Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro. The other eleven trail far behind: only four are polling above 1 per cent, and Augusto Cury, a mental health specialist whose self-help books have been translated into over 90 languages, is the only one to have reached 10 per cent in a poll, although in the most recent surveys he stands at around 6 per cent. According to the latest available polls, Lula is leading in the first round with 39 per cent against Flávio’s 34 per cent; in a run-off, however, the two are neck and neck at 42 per cent.

Given the purely moral nature of the pact, there are no provisions for legal coercion, nor, of course, any sanctions. It is a sort of technologically updated replica of the ‘lawless order’ – to quote a well-known book by the American jurist Robert Ellickson – which characterises the resolution of disputes between neighbours and which, to some extent, characterised the order of the Wild West. From the internal colonisation of the frontier to the frontier of artificial intelligence, in practice: after all, the agreement expressly refers to ‘responsibilities linked to the frontier’. And just as in the frontier described—with romanticised overtones—by Frederick Turner, where the arm of the law continued to operate simply by standing on the sidelines and being ready to intervene when necessary, the White House agreement also provides for the possibility that certain specific elements and areas may become subject to regulation.

Nor is it ruled out, as Trump pointed out whilst reading the clause in the text, that a committee comprising ten people representing the most significant companies could be established, headed by the White House’s Artificial Intelligence Coordinator. The key points of the agreement, which will apply to all companies involved in the AI race, consist of a substantial increase in internal controls and safety systems, particularly in the fields of cyber security and biological and chemical research, a qualitative and quantitative expansion of supervisory teams, partnerships with external and independent assessors, and the establishment of the aforementioned board, which is intended to act as a conduit and link between AI leaders, enabling them to discuss and monitor one another. The text and concept of the agreement are the result of the diplomatic efforts of David Sacks, former White House adviser on AI and cryptocurrencies, as well as a venture capitalist belonging to the ‘PayPal Mafia’ and a long-standing friend and collaborator of Peter Thiel dating back to their days at the Stanford Review. However, a substantial contribution was also made by Huang and Musk, who – not coincidentally – sat on either side of Trump at the banquet table, in true Praetorian style.

There is no doubt that the greatest problems will arise in relation to cross-checks and audits, given that all attempts to date have proved highly unsatisfactory. The very emergence of organisations such as METR – an independent evaluation body for cutting-edge AI models – has revealed decidedly opaque aspects and undeclared yet obvious conflicts of interest; several employees of the audit bodies come from the very same companies that are supposed to be audited. In reality, the agreement also implies another commitment – one that is not explicitly stated but has been discussed and agreed upon amongst tech leaders: to make AI, and above all data centres, appealing to American citizens once again. The popularity of high technology in the United States is in freefall; in March, a Gartner survey revealed that 70 per cent of respondents were opposed to the construction of data centres near their cities of residence. In mid-September, the same level of opposition was confirmed by an NPR/PBS survey. On 16 September, the House of Representatives passed the Ratepayer Protection Act, a law designed to protect energy consumers, requiring data centre owners to bear the cost of energy price rises financially without passing the burden on to the public.

The idea put forward by Trump and the Silicon Valley figures surrounding him is to establish a comprehensive system of incentives for communities that host data centres, whilst also developing technologies for infrastructure construction, heat dissipation and water consumption, in order to minimise their environmental impact.

The attack foiled yesterday in Dubai, in which an Omani pilot attempted to crash a Flydubai aircraft bound for Tel Aviv with 180 Israeli passengers on board, has brought to mind numerous attacks thwarted by the Israelis. A 9/11-style attack was prevented at cruising altitude thanks to the intervention of the Israeli passengers. Some call it the ‘militarisation of the skies’. It is a euphemism used by those who live under gentler skies.

Take, for example, the case of the Israeli spy who infiltrated ISIS and provided intelligence regarding a plot to bring down a commercial airliner in Europe using a bomb concealed in a laptop. According to information carelessly revealed by Donald Trump to the Russians, the device had managed to pass through airport security checks undetected. The information was so reliable that the United States and the United Kingdom banned laptops in the cabin on many flights from the Middle East. In this instance, Israel did not stop a single flight that had already taken off: it stopped a method intended for use on dozens of aircraft. ISIS had already claimed responsibility for the attack that, two years earlier, had caused a Russian passenger aircraft to explode over the Sinai, killing over two hundred people.

In 1986, on a flight from London to Tel Aviv, a Palestinian man, Nezar Hindawi, had planted a bomb in the suitcase of a female passenger and his partner, Anne Marie Murphy, who was unaware she was carrying it. The aircraft was carrying four hundred people. That same year, on a flight from Madrid to Tel Aviv, Nasser Hassan al Ali attempted to detonate a suitcase on a flight carrying one hundred passengers. Fast-forward to 2006, when an Israeli aircraft was the target of another terrorist plot. This time, the plan centred on Frankfurt Airport.

In 2017, an Australian citizen sent his brother to Sydney Airport to board an Etihad Airways flight to Dubai, carrying a bomb concealed inside a meat mincer and constructed according to instructions from Islamic State. Khaled Khayat and Mahmoud Khayat, the two terrorists, were sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment. “The Israeli secret services foiled the downing of an Australian aircraft; it would have been an unimaginable massacre,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Australia described it as “one of the most sophisticated plots ever attempted on Australian soil”. A year later, at a NATO summit, Netanyahu revealed that Israel had “thwarted dozens of serious attacks, some targeting civil aviation”, including in Europe, “preventing hijacked planes from crashing into European cities”.

This was political confirmation that the public sees only a fraction of the picture. Israel had warned Belgian officials weeks before the attack about inadequate security measures at Brussels Zaventem Airport. The warning had come from Israeli officials tasked with assessing security standards at airports operating flights to Tel Aviv. The Israelis had identified “significant shortcomings” at the Belgian airport, which was the scene of the attacks just a few days later. One member of the cell had reportedly also intended to target the gates for Tel Aviv and the United States.

Yesterday, it was only thanks to the quick thinking of the Israelis on board that a 9/11-style attack was averted. The Jewish state continues to bring down planes full of survivors.

“Technology has enabled us to conduct offensive operations with reduced forces and with a casualty ratio that is extraordinarily favourable to us,” says Borodin, going on to explain that drones (UAVs) play a significant role: “All their parallel actions function as a single mechanism, a single system that allows us to maintain parity with the enemy in low-altitude airspace.” The interaction between reconnaissance and attack assets “enables us to destroy the enemy quickly,” says Borodin, “by expanding the kill zone”, which is a priority objective because if this zone is large, the Russians are forced back, direct firefights are reduced, and lives are saved. “Thanks to the systematic destruction of Rubicon’s launch sites – the Russians’ finest unit of unmanned aerial vehicles – and the depletion of its reserves, we have managed to paralyse its operations, along with those of numerous other enemy drone units,” continues Borodin, “and the Third Army Corps’ air defence system, structured in echelons, deserves a special mention, as it has ensured the air defence units’ total dominance of the airspace within its area of responsibility”. Borodin goes into detail, but remains clear: one can grasp the extraordinary nature of this offensive, and the care he shows for the men carrying it out. Sometimes, in accounts of war, the technological or strategic aspects are emphasised, and in cases of success, the operations seem almost easy. But this is not the case: they are complex, dangerous and deadly. Borodin conveys the extraordinary nature of the operation, the care taken and the risks involved. “We have established a unified radar network, as well as a mechanism for coordination with drone units, electronic warfare units and ground troops to respond swiftly to reports of enemy activity in the vicinity of our positions. Taken together, these actions limited the enemy’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and adjust the fire of drones and artillery”, thereby increasing the Third Corps’ offensive potential and enabling Ukrainian forces to move undetected.

The use of so-called electronic warfare – which effectively renders the enemy blind and deaf – gave an advantage on the battlefield that counterbalanced that of the Russians, who were on high ground and therefore in a very favourable position. “We repelled the enemy drones sector by sector,” says Borodin, “pushing them further and further back into their own territory, and we blocked their flight paths. Co-ordination with air defence units, together with unconventional solutions – such as equipping ground-based drones (UGVs, or as we call them: robots) with electronic warfare equipment – facilitated evacuations and logistical missions, as well as preventing the enemy from conducting in-depth reconnaissance’. With this mix of assets and the increase in the number of crews operating interceptor drones, it has been possible to carry out mechanised assaults. A telling example is that of the Second Mechanised Battalion of the Third Assault Brigade during the breakthrough between Serednje and Karpivka: “Thanks to the concentration of electronic warfare assets, a ‘blind spot’ was created, which allowed armoured vehicles to penetrate deep into the enemy’s defences in wooded areas,” says Borodin. “We deployed our troops, evacuated the wounded and even managed to repeat the manoeuvre several times.” For the first time, medium-depth strikes were employed, and a system was established based on coordination with other units – in particular with air defence – which enables effective strikes on three levels up to two hundred kilometres from the line of contact.

Earth-based robots have become one of the key factors in the success of Operation Vivaldi: “80 per cent of logistics and 90 per cent of evacuations were handled by UGVs”, which were deployed in sabotage operations: “We have adopted a new tactic involving the mounting of single-use Bullspike grenade launchers on kamikaze UGVs, which has enabled us both to exert psychological pressure on the enemy and to strike them,” says Borodin. “Another historic moment was the so-called ‘Grifone’ tactic: we were the first to deploy UGVs using heavy bomber drones.” Ground-based robotic systems based on armoured personnel carriers are now crucial for destroying Russian positions, with a twofold effect: demoralising the enemy and advancing into built-up areas – in this case Nove and Katerynivka – while destroying “an enemy command and communications hub”.

During Operation Vivaldi, robots equipped with combat modules were used in conjunction with the troops’ assault operations: kamikaze UGVs targeted command posts, drone operator positions and areas where Russian soldiers were gathering in the rear. “With UGVs, as well as with unmanned systems, it is possible to lay mines remotely, isolating future combat zones, which prevents the enemy from both bringing up reserves and advancing its assault groups,” explains Borodin.

The Third Army Corps was the first to use UGVs for demining operations and the first to do so during an offensive operation: as part of Operation Vivaldi, more than 30 kilometres of territory have already been cleared of mines in this way. There is also an organisational first: for the first time, the work of the units responsible for ground robots has been integrated into the brigades and then extended to the entire Army Corps, which is precisely the objective set by General Andriy Biletsky: to reduce the number of soldiers in the most dangerous areas and replace them with robots. Once again: technology, strategy and the protection of our most precious asset – human life.

Kyiv is now under the threat of bombardment at any time of the day or night. Before Russia resumed its attacks on the energy sector, its strikes had been focused on data centres, internet service providers and mobile phone operators. Drones struck Kyiv’s business districts and the offices housed there. On 27 September, the Russian Ministry of Defence boasted of having carried out a ‘digital detox’ operation. However, it appears to be acting on the basis of out-of-date information. For example, on 28 September, in the middle of the working day, a drone struck the private Dobrobut medical centre in central Kyiv. The building once housed the headquarters of Ukrtelecom, one of the largest internet service providers, but the site has long since been converted into a hospital.

“It is physically impossible to destroy the internet and communications in Ukraine,” Oleksandr Glushchenko, an expert in digital technologies, told Il Foglio. “There are thousands of internet service providers operating in the country and competition between them is fierce. Even if the bombing of data centres were to cause temporary disruptions (for example, Kyiv City Council has reported problems with the public transport payment system), the country will still have access to the internet,” he assures us. The internet is also available in frontline areas. The expert believes that the aim of the current attacks is not to disrupt communications, but to cause widespread damage to the economy.

In fact, alongside its attacks on communications, Russia is targeting industry and businesses. For example, following the bombings, the steel giants Zaporizhstal in Zaporizhzhia and ArcelorMittal in Kryvyi Rih have temporarily suspended operations at their sites, where thousands of people were employed.

The Fozzy Group, which includes the popular Silpo supermarket chain, recently announced that it had been forced to make some of its staff redundant because more than 20 of its facilities (distribution centres, warehouses, supermarkets) were destroyed or damaged between 1 August and 25 September. But Russia’s new tactics are not limited to physical destruction. “One hour of air raid alert costs the country 2 billion hryvnias (around 40 million euros),” the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy told Il Foglio. In the event of a bombing threat, many companies halt operations and employees take shelter. As air-raid alerts can last more than 10 hours a day, this results in long periods of inactivity and substantial economic losses.

All this is happening because Russia is currently unable to achieve its objectives on the front line. Ukrainian troops are thwarting its plans. Operation Vivaldi is currently underway in the Lyman sector, in the Donetsk region, and several occupied villages have returned to Ukrainian control. “Consequently, Moscow is shifting the war to the rear,” explains Mykola Kniazhytskyi, an MP for the European Solidarity party. “A low-cost drone can destroy not only a building, but also a sense of stability,” says the MP. The current attacks are not targeting servers, supermarkets or petrol stations. The enemy is trying to sow panic amongst the population, leading them to believe that the internet, electricity and food will soon disappear. But despite the losses, Kniazhytskyi is convinced that Russia’s plans will fail: “Ukraine will not be left without the internet or fuel, and the state will not cease to exist,” he reassures.

Lecornu’s plan to reduce the deficit excludes across-the-board tax increases. Firstly, the aim is to keep spending at 2026 levels, except for interest on the national debt and defence spending, and to cut funding for ministries and agencies. Secondly, the plan is to make changes to social security (healthcare, basic pensions and child benefits), aiming to cut its annual deficit from 22 billion in 2026 to 12–13 billion in 2027. The government is also proposing not to increase the index point – the figure used to calculate public sector salaries, which has been frozen since 2023. To achieve savings of €4.1 billion in the social security budget, Labour Minister Jean-Pierre Farandou clarified yesterday that only pensions up to €1,260 per month would be fully adjusted for inflation, while higher pensions would see smaller increases. A further €9 billion of the €54 billion in savings is expected to come from measures already introduced this year.

With Renaissance, the MoDem, Horizons and Les Républicains, the government has just over 200 MPs out of 577, so it does not have a majority. On the 2026 budget, which was only approved in February, Lecornu was saved by the Socialist Party in exchange for scrapping the 2023 pension reform, which would have gradually raised the minimum retirement age from 62 to 64; thus, ten days ago, the Prime Minister wrote to Socialist MPs to propose a new compromise on the budget. The Socialists are calling for a tax on large inheritances, something Lecornu’s government rules out, and on 27 September, Secretary Olivier Faure, who is standing in the presidential primaries, stated that “if nothing changes (compared to the current proposal, ed.), we will vote for a motion of no confidence”. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France insoumise will vote for a motion of no confidence in the government in any case and, to balance the public finances, has even proposed writing off a fifth of France’s debt. Marine Le Pen, leader of the Rassemblement National (RN), has said that an imperfect budget is better than no budget at all – given that she could amend it if elected – but that she will vote against it if pensions are not adjusted for inflation. On 17 September, Lecornu promised not to invoke Article 49.3 of the Constitution, under which the budget is deemed approved without a vote by MPs unless the National Assembly passes a vote of no confidence, provided the parties refrain from filibustering. However, on 28 September, the Minister for Relations with Parliament, Laurent Panifous, described approval by a vote as “very difficult” and did not rule out the use of Article 49.3. In short, to get the budget approved, Lecornu will need either Le Pen or the Socialists: in an ordinary vote, where abstentions are not counted, it would be enough for RN to abstain for him to prevail against the ‘no’ votes from the left; under Article 49.3, it would be enough for one of the two not to vote in favour of the motion of no confidence. Otherwise, there is the ‘loi spéciale’, used last year, which would allow the state to enter 2027 with the capacity to finance essential expenditure (according to the Treasury, this would increase the deficit by half a percentage point of GDP).

Meanwhile, yesterday the yield on French 10-year bonds exceeded 4.8 per cent, the highest since 2008. According to Reuters, this reflects doubts about France’s public finances and political stability, whilst for Luis Garicano, an economist at the LSE and director of the Rhine Group, the proposal to write off the debt plays a major role: “This absurd debate has undermined both France’s credibility and the ECB’s room for manoeuvre, because the TPI (editor’s note: the instrument through which the ECB can buy a country’s bonds if its spread rises without economic justification) only counteracts ‘unjustified and disorderly’ market dynamics. But higher yields for countries that might not wish to pay their debts are not unjustified,” he added. The Governor of the Banque de France, Emmanuel Moulin, reiterated that the means to correct the deficit lie in the hands of the government and parliament. Today, Lecornu will present the plan.

The result of such haste was a frantic meeting, with negotiations continuing right up to the last minute and culminating in a decree which, in the end – to keep everyone happy – was split into two. There were even two press conferences. One was held by the Socialists, which was confused and full of stammering from the Minister for Housing Policy, Isabel Rodríguez, who was visibly unprepared for a text that was still being finalised. Another was held by the ministers of the Sumar coalition, who presented a far more concise and radical proposal: permanent contracts or those with automatic renewal, and an obligation for the landlord to compensate the tenant with the equivalent of at least 12 months’ rent in the event of unjustified termination. A proposal that was scrapped because it was already doomed to fail.

The first proposal stands a slightly better chance, but it must win over centrist and strongly regionalist parties such as the Basque PNV and the Catalan Junts, which are more attuned to the middle classes. The decree extends protection against evictions until 2030 and establishes a ban until 2028 on the purchase of property by ‘vulture’ funds, whatever that may mean. Minister Rodríguez acknowledged that Urbagestión, the company that owns Maricarmen’s home, is not a speculative fund but simply an ‘SME’ – that is, a small and medium-sized enterprise – stating (this time without stammering) that they are nonetheless vultures and scavengers.

Meanwhile, Urbagestión has reached an agreement with Maricarmen, and she, having just been discharged from hospital, will be able to return home. But it is now too late to defuse the social time bomb, a weapon that could make all the difference in the battle looming ahead of next year’s elections. The leaders at Puerta del Sol – the square where hundreds of activists have been camped out for days, visited by a constant stream of VIPs – have already made it clear that they have no intention of breaking camp, as the measures taken so far are insufficient. This situation suits the left as a whole, because the protesters did not gather outside Isabel Rodríguez’s ministry, but rather in front of the headquarters of the Autonomous Community of Madrid, led by Isabel Díaz Ayuso of the People’s Party. But perhaps it suits the far-left best of all, as they are seeking to wear Sánchez down in order to stem the flow of tactical voting (however beset by scandals, in the upcoming general election the Socialist Party will still be the only bulwark against the advance of the right).

An extreme left that, for the most part, is increasingly showing itself to be both militant and government-oriented. Yolanda Díaz’s personality seems two-faced, much like Tuesday’s press conference; just a few days ago, at the Spanish Communist Party’s conference, she urged the people to mobilise against the government of which she is a minister and deputy prime minister. We shall see how she reacts to the rejection of the most radical measures proposed by her group. Many are betting on her remaining silent, because behind those fiery speeches lies an ally whom Sánchez has definitively brought to heel with her candidacy for the Director-General of the International Labour Organisation (the vote is on 16 November).

Ali Asgari, director of the film “Un po’ di luce” – Kami Nour in Persian – in competition at the 83rd Venice Film Festival, arrived in Rome on Tuesday, where he studied for ten years, to present a preview of his latest film at the Greenwich cinema – a film “about life continuing amidst tragedy”, he says. “For a year we were surrounded by numerous tragedies, but I always saw this life, running on a parallel track and continuing, undisturbed. I didn’t want to make a film about the war, about the massacre of young Iranians, but about its effects. Nor did I want to make a dark film: as the title suggests, I wanted to portray a little light that still exists at the end of Iran’s tunnel – the light we are seeking, in the everyday reality of life that carries on.” Ali tells Il Foglio that he came up with the idea for the film in June last year, during the Twelve-Day War, and was struck by how life carried on, against the backdrop of the bombing, followed by the subsequent protests that were brutally suppressed: “I wanted to portray this contrast – war and life continuing side by side, the fragile boundary between despair and the silent forces that keep us anchored to life.” Life lies in the small, everyday gestures, in family ties that waver but do not break, in the plants that take over the rooms and survive as they are passed from house to house, in the clandestine performances without hijabs. Arash has decided to take his own life, but life continues to pursue him; the green leaves of his plants are so large they won’t even fit in his car; he keeps giving them away, and yet he remains unemptied.

“He is haunted by small signs of life and light that never leave him alone,” says the director: flowers, trees, animals: “In the film, I tell the story of a person who wants to die, but it is life itself that keeps seeking him out.” War, on the other hand, is present in Trump’s threats of bombing – “it could strike at any moment”, as is repeated on several occasions – in the tape on the windows used for protection, in the regime’s calls from an unknown number that never stops monitoring you, in the blocked internet, in the seals on a doctor’s surgery who had the audacity to ‘want to save the world’ by treating the ‘rebels’, and in the fear of taking one’s son to hospital for fear that he might be arrested. ‘War gives you strange ideas, you know?’ a friend remarks. ‘Demolishing it costs more than rebuilding it, and if a missile were to hit it, I’d save myself the cost of demolition – after all, Trump has said his strikes will be targeted and won’t hit civilians. Trump would never lie; he’s sure of that.’ While trying to explain to his three brothers the darkness into which he has sunk, Arash always sees a glimmer of light. The ultimate challenge is the moment when he’ll have to tell his mother about his decision, but first Masia takes him to her son’s show; they have to hand in their mobiles because it’s all clandestine. ‘It’s ridiculous,’ comments his youngest sister Mahsa, ‘it’s not as if we were robbing someone.’ On stage, the young man has to say goodbye to his mother before fleeing abroad; she begs him not to leave, then calls out to the audience from the stage: “Can you persuade my son to change his mind?” One member of the audience replies: let him go; there’s nothing he can do here. Arash says nothing. Even at the final family dinner with his mother, everyone will be far too quiet; then the sound of laughter will return, along with hot dishes, music and a Kurdish dance in which bodies draw closer and hands clasp and intertwine, bringing a little light back into the room.

The composition of the campaign team ahead of next year’s presidential election is the clearest indication of this. On 14 September, Le Pen brought men and women from her inner circle into the heart of the campaign machinery. First and foremost, Renaud Labaye, a long-standing loyalist of the leader, who has been appointed deputy campaign director and will work alongside Yoann Gillet, who has held the same post since 3 July. Sébastien Chenu, an MP and Marine’s right-hand man, has been appointed coordinator of elected representatives, whilst Andréa Kotarac, who left Mélenchon’s left in 2019 to embrace Le Penism, has been named campaign spokesperson. But it is also those who have been removed, or sidelined, that reveal this new phase for the RN. François Durvye, an economic adviser close to Bardella and a key figure in the attempt to build a more economically liberal RN, has stepped down. Pierre-Romain Thionnet, a staunch Bardella loyalist, has been removed from the chairmanship of the party’s youth wing, and Victor Chabert, another of Bardella’s staunchest supporters, remains head of the RN’s press office but will not serve as the presidential campaign’s press officer. Finally, policy work has returned to the control of the ‘Horaces’, the group of intellectuals close to Marine Le Pen, under the supervision of the sovereigntist leader’s brother-in-law and special adviser, Philippe Olivier.

Political differences over certain key issues in the programme have also highlighted the growing rift between the two in recent months. Marine, should she be elected to the Élysée, promises to repeal the pension reform introduced by Emmanuel Macron, which raised the retirement age from 62 to 64, and for certain categories she does not rule out lowering it further, to 60. Bardella, on the other hand, advocates a more liberal stance, in line with that of Medef, the French employers’ organisation, and has on several occasions expressed doubts about the sustainability of the current pension system. There is also a divide over the Islamic headscarf, one of the sovereignist party’s long-standing issues. Marine has promised to ban it in public spaces – not just in schools – via a referendum, thereby meeting the demands of the party’s conservative wing, whilst Bardella has taken a more cautious stance, insisting on the need to distinguish between the Muslim faith and Islamism. This is not a definitive ideological split, but it demonstrates the existence of two strategies within RN: Marine’s, which returns to mobilising the traditional identity-based themes of the Front National, and Bardella’s, which is more geared towards building his own image as a national right-wing figure capable of appealing even to voters whom the old RN never reached.

For over a year, the balance of power had been almost the reverse of what it traditionally is. Marine, weakened by the legal proceedings concerning her European parliamentary assistants and by the prospect of possible ineligibility following the first-instance ruling in March 2025, had made way for her heir apparent ahead of the presidential elections. Bardella had begun to forge his own political identity, achieving a level of popularity in numerous polls that even surpassed that of his mentor. Then came the ruling of 7 July, which turned the situation on its head once again: the Court of Appeal’s decision allowed Le Pen to immediately relaunch her candidacy for 2027, whilst Bardella reverted to his role as the designated prime minister – the eternal number two. It is against this backdrop that what some observers have termed the ‘re-Le Penisation’ of the RN has begun to take shape – that is, Marine’s reclaiming of personal and familial control over the party’s structure. The reconciliation between Marine and Marion Maréchal – the niece who, in 2022, had sided with the inflammatory polemicist Éric Zemmour, leader of Réconquête, against her aunt – points in this direction. Marion, currently a Member of the European Parliament and president of the Identité-Libertés party, published a book in January with the telling title, "Si tu te sens Le Pen", and following the death of her grandfather and National Front founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, she has gradually re-established ties with the family. Marine wants to bring her back into her political orbit, even though her precise role in the campaign has not yet been defined, because she can broaden the scope of the future campaign further to the right: a problem for Bardella, who in 2024 had helped to curb the inclusion of men and women close to Marion on the lists for the parliamentary elections.

Tensions between the two came to a head at the end of August. According to Libération, during an internal meeting, Bardella reportedly reacted to the plan to give Marion more space with the phrase: “C’est elle ou moi”, meaning ‘it’s her or me’. The RN president’s position has been further complicated in recent days by revelations from Mediapart regarding anti-Semitic messages he allegedly wrote when he was 17 and a rank-and-file party activist. “All banks are owned by Jews. (…) The Jew must dominate other peoples, crush them and rob them; a Zionist is necessarily a Jew, deep down. In France, two excellent examples are BHL (Bernard Henri-Lévy) and (Jacques) Attali. And this is precisely what they want: a New World Order dominated by Israel, with Jerusalem, of course, as its capital”, Bardella is reported to have written. Mediapart claims to have investigated the matter for months and to be in possession of dozens of independently verified conversations. Bardella has categorically denied being the author of those statements and says he is prepared to take Mediapart to court. As things stand, these are therefore contested allegations, not facts established in court, but politically the issue is explosive because it strikes at the very heart of one of the pillars of the RN’s transformation under Marine: ‘dédiabolisation’, that is, the attempt to make the party presentable to a much broader electorate than its historical base.

“I think the main damage to the RN, following these revelations, is the potential loss of undecided voters – that is, those who, in a possible second round against the leader of the radical left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, might have been tempted to vote for Marine Le Pen without being regular voters for the party,” political scientist Jean-Yves Camus, director of the Observatoire des radicalités politiques at the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, tells Il Foglio. Some argue that Bardella was only 17, and that at that age people say all sorts of things. “One is always responsible for what one writes. That does not, however, mean that one holds the same views for one’s entire life. But one thing is certain: the damage is done. Marine Le Pen’s future prime minister-designate now has hundreds of articles claiming he was anti-Semitic,” emphasises Camus. But who passed the messages on to Mediapart, which promises to publish them in the coming days? “According to some, they come from supporters of Alain Soral,” says Camus, referring to the anti-Semitic writer and former member of the National Front who is said to have influenced the political development of the RN president and some of his close associates when they were teenagers. “It would therefore appear to be an act of revenge against Bardella who, by travelling to Israel and adopting pro-Israeli positions in recent times, has in some way betrayed the ideals of his youth,” concludes Camus.

The aircraft had taken off from Dubai at 5.05 Italian time (7.05 in the Emirates); preliminary flight data showed ‘extreme fluctuations’, with drastic drops and sudden climbs at unusual speeds. A couple of hours later, the generic emergency code was transmitted, followed by the code signalling ‘unlawful interference’ – a possible hijacking. It will take some time before every single moment on board the aircraft can be reconstructed, but whilst the codes were being transmitted and changed, and as the aircraft lost altitude, a struggle was taking place on board to thwart an alleged attack aimed at causing the aircraft to crash with 174 passengers on board – many of whom were Israeli – and seven crew members. The incident is being interpreted as an attack on Israel and on the Abraham Accords – the new framework envisaged for the Middle East, which began in 2020 precisely with the normalisation of relations between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi – and which some do not want, oppose and are attempting to halt. Among the opponents are the Islamic Republic of Iran and terrorist groups such as Hamas, which, on 7 October 2023, after massacring and kidnapping Israelis in kibbutzim in the south of the country, stated that its pogrom was also intended to halt those revolutionary relations that were changing the face of the region. The Flydubai aircraft subsequently landed in Saudi Arabia, at Tabuk Airport: the Israeli passengers were treated by Saudi medical staff and then flown home to Israel.

During the attack, it was the Israeli passengers who subdued the assailant—a reaction that only a population in a state of perpetual alert could muster. They filmed videos while on board; blood can be seen on their faces, on their clothes and in the cabin. Once the plane had landed at Tabuk Airport, the attacker was handed over to the police, and the Saudis were the first to question him. In such a context, it is highly unlikely that there were no direct contacts between the Israelis and the Saudis – Riyadh is one of the most important pillars of the Abraham Accords, according to many the most valuable – and yesterday, in the contacts that likely took place, it emerged that relations are more advanced than the two countries wish to show, as was the case with the Saudis’ refusal to allow Israeli aircraft into their airspace, as initially requested by Jerusalem, to facilitate the repatriation of the Israeli passengers. Building the new Middle East remains a complex task; there is still a vast gulf between covert contacts and what is out in the open – such as the entry of the Israeli Air Force into Saudi airspace would have been. Covert dealings continue to be permissible and supported, and this is precisely what Hamas sought to prevent; even this level of contact is not accepted by Tehran.

Pieces of the puzzle are missing; statements and accounts have appeared in a fragmented manner in the Israeli press, but the image of the aircraft in a nosedive and the blood on the passengers’ bodies shows that Israel remains a target for attacks and sabotage. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the first among the authorities to speak out, stating that Israel was treating the incident as a terrorist attack. This remains the main line of inquiry, which the Shin Bet and the Mossad are also investigating. With the commemorations for 7 October just a few days away, in a war against the Islamic Republic of Iran that has never truly ended, a new Middle East is taking shape, albeit with great difficulty. And it is a risky process.

Reuters, however, has read the executive summary prepared for the leaders, and the verdict is clear: the EU is not rearming quickly enough or effectively enough to be ready to defend itself against Russia by 2030. The agency writes that national plans “do not appear sufficient” to address the shortfalls in air and missile defence, land combat, naval forces, ammunition stocks and drones. To achieve this, more needs to be done – and much faster than at present. The report acknowledges progress on spending, capability development and industrial readiness, underpinned by closer partnerships, particularly with Ukraine. But the message to governments is that this is not enough.

The date given is no coincidence. 2030 is the deadline set by the March 2025 Defence White Paper: citing intelligence, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius had stated that Moscow was preparing to test NATO’s Article 5, and that within five years, or even sooner, it might be capable of attacking one or more EU countries.

In short, the money is there, and it is growing faster than expected. Between 2022 and 2025, spending rose by 47 per cent. In 2025, equipment purchases reached 115 billion, and twenty-three member states spent at least 2 per cent of their GDP. The forecast for 2026 stands at 454 billion, 2.4 per cent of GDP. But turning those billions into ammunition and drones is no easy task. As early as July, the EDA warned that the race is being held back by the armed forces’ capacity to absorb and spend the funds: industrial lead times, administrative processes, personnel, and long-term sustainability. And then there is the age-old flaw in European defence: fragmentation. In 2025, purchases made with other partners accounted for just 24 per cent of the total – a long way from the EU’s target of at least 40 per cent of equipment being procured jointly by 2030. More is being spent, but each country is acting on its own.

Brussels’ response, for now, lies in projects. Last Monday, five European defence projects of common interest were formally approved: drones, air and missile defence, military space, maritime and seabed security, and defence of the eastern flank. These are precisely the areas that the report identifies as gaps. But approving a programme does not mean having armed forces ready. Years can pass between the signing of a project and the delivery of an anti-aircraft battery. There are only four years to go until 2030 and, unfortunately, Europe does not set the timetable. This week, Moscow handed NATO a non-paper in which it threatens to use its entire arsenal should the Alliance attempt to isolate Kaliningrad. The money, at last, is there. Time, however, is in much shorter supply.

Let’s rewind. Earlier this morning (Italian time), Israeli media reported that a Flydubai passenger aircraft (FZ 1073), flying from Dubai to Tel Aviv with around 180 people on board, had first transmitted the transponder code 7700 – which indicates an emergency – and shortly afterwards 7500, used to signal a possible hijacking or an act of unlawful interference. The aircraft also lowered its altitude and altered its course, heading towards Saudi Arabia instead of Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport. Israeli security procedures were therefore activated, and two Israeli Air Force fighter jets were scrambled.

Shortly afterwards, Israeli media reported that the flight had landed at Tabuk Airport. According to Israeli security sources, the emergency signals were triggered by an altercation on board the flight. The airline is also said to have confirmed this version of events. According to reports by the Israeli broadcaster Channel 12, FlyDubai reportedly announced that “the pilots had a scuffle in the cockpit during the flight, until one of them lost consciousness. This was not a safety incident”. The airline stated later in the day that the reasons for a row “which took place in the cockpit of flight FZ 1073” remain unknown and are the subject of a formal investigation, according to a spokesperson in a statement. “We urge all parties to refrain from premature speculation whilst the authorities piece together the facts,” the statement reads. 

Netanyahu: “The co-pilot stabbed the captain and intended to crash the plane”

According to reports from the live blog of the Israeli newspaper The Times of Israel, one of the pilots on the FlyDubai flight allegedly attempted to crash the aircraft before being stopped by the other pilot with the help of some passengers. However, these are unconfirmed rumours, though they have been widely reported by the Israeli media based on accounts gathered from those on board. Initial reports suggested that one of the pilots was of Russian origin and the co-pilot of Ukrainian origin. According to the Israeli newspaper Ynet, however, the pilot who allegedly attempted to crash the plane is an Omani national, whilst the other is from the UAE.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has convened a new summit with security and aviation officials to assess the situation of the flight’s passengers. This is reported by Ynet. “We are in constant contact with the relevant countries to ensure the passengers’ safe return to Israel,” the Israeli Prime Minister stated. “The co-pilot stabbed the captain and apparently intended to cause the plane to crash,” he said. "I spoke to one of the Israeli passengers who intervened to stop the attacker; they showed incredible courage and prevented a huge tragedy," the Prime Minister added, noting that the attacker is currently being questioned by the Saudi authorities. “I pay tribute to the heroes on board the flight from Dubai, who demonstrated alertness, courage and resourcefulness. I have instructed the security services to prepare to deal with any further threats,” Netanyahu went on to say.

Saudi Arabia has rejected Israel’s request to allow its aircraft to repatriate Israeli passengers on board the flight, according to a Reuters online report citing two security sources. The request was aimed at allowing Israeli military aircraft to collect Israeli citizens from Saudi Arabia, a country which does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, the sources specified. The Saudi government’s press office did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The Israeli Air Force was preparing to send Super Hercules military transport aircraft to retrieve the Israeli passengers, one of the sources reported. The repatriation of the passengers to Tel Aviv was instead arranged using a FlyDubai aircraft. However, some of the Israeli passengers refused to board the airline’s repatriation flight, which had landed in Saudi Arabia, claiming that they were “afraid to fly on one of the airline’s planes again” and that they were expecting an Israeli security repatriation flight. The FlyDubai repatriation flight subsequently landed at Tel Aviv-Ben Gurion International Airport.

Israeli media are reporting that the Mossad and the Shin Bet are involved in the investigation into the incident on the FlyDubai flight. Passengers will be questioned upon their arrival in Israel. According to reports, Israel is finalising the necessary arrangements to allow Israeli aircraft to land in Saudi Arabia, given that the two countries do not have diplomatic relations. Transport Minister Miri Regev has called for the suspension of FlyDubai flights to Israel pending the investigation into the accident involving the aircraft bound for Tel Aviv. This is also reported by the Israeli media, which state that the minister has also asked the Civil Aviation Authority to check whether the United Arab Emirates has breached the agreement with Israel, under which only pilots holding passports from countries with which Israel maintains diplomatic relations are authorised to land in Israel. This comes in the light of rumours that the co-pilot involved in the assault is an Omani national. 

Investigations and passengers’ accounts: “We heard screams on the plane, and then there was blood too”

“We heard screams on the plane. Then they opened the cockpit and we saw blood,” a passenger told the Israeli broadcaster Channel 12. According to her, one of the pilots was stabbed with a small knife and some Israeli passengers helped the crew to subdue an attacker. Another witness reports that one of the pilots was seriously injured and that, at that moment, the aircraft began a rapid descent. 

Another Israeli passenger, Daniel, also told Channel 12 about the dramatic moments he experienced on board. “Suddenly I heard a scuffle, something that sounded like a brawl coming from the cockpit. The door was slightly ajar and I saw someone trying to push another person out. Then three Israelis sitting behind me came to see what was happening and suddenly the plane began a very steep nosedive, nose-down, accompanied by a violent roll,” he added. “I thought: it’s over. 11 September has happened again.”

A few figures help to better understand the dynamics of the flight. Tracking data cited by the Times of Israel show that the aircraft suddenly descended from an altitude of around 10 kilometres to 5 kilometres in less than a minute, whilst simultaneously accelerating from 411 to almost 600 knots. After a brief climb to around 6.5 kilometres, it descended again to below 4.5 kilometres. The aircraft subsequently re-established communications and landed at Tabuk Airport. While efforts are underway to clarify the incident, an image taken aboard the aircraft is circulating in Israeli media and on social media, showing a passenger with a bloodstained shirt. According to the Israeli media outlet Ynet, the man is said to have intervened to separate the pilot and co-pilot during the brawl that broke out in the cockpit.

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Moscow has spoken of threats that ‘significantly increase the risk of an armed conflict’. NATO has responded that the Alliance is defensive and poses no threat to Russia. Moscow, however, builds the ideological framework for its wars on the premise of a perpetual threat. The Kremlin leader has signed a decree to increase the strength of the Russian Armed Forces by 15,500 personnel, bringing the number of active-duty military personnel to 1.55 million. At present, Moscow is not informing the Russian people of the outcome of Operation Vivaldi, through which Ukraine is recapturing parts of the Donetsk Oblast; nor is it reporting on the surrender of military personnel who, though high-ranking, are unprepared and taken by surprise, and agree to hand over their weapons to Kyiv. It makes no mention of how Putin’s ambitions to swiftly conquer the whole of Donetsk are more wishful thinking than calculations based on the realities of the battlefield. It does, however, explain the rationale behind the need to increase troop numbers; indeed, in an article published in Komsomolskaya Pravda and in various appearances on Russian television talk shows, generals and military experts are endeavouring to explain Putin’s decree. In Komsomolskaya Pravda, Colonel Viktor Barents writes that the Kremlin is not conscripting for the war – or at least not solely for that purpose – but is primarily expanding its ‘standard parameters’ in response to the ‘growing threats from NATO and Europe’. Moscow needs more men to deploy in Donetsk, not to guard its borders; yet the years of stalemate cannot be explained indefinitely by an endless war against Kyiv. It is more convenient to ensure that the perception of threat within Russian society is amplified a hundredfold.

For 2027, Moscow plans to increase its defence budget by 27 per cent. With every move, Russia demonstrates that the path to negotiation is extremely narrow, but the only way forward that Putin sees involves combat and new weapons to be launched against cities far removed from the battlefield, whilst on the front line the Ukrainians are finding ways to use technology to repel the hordes of men sent by Putin to fight.

Panic in the EU over a potential energy crisis caused by a diesel shortage – resulting from an export ban imposed by the Trump administration – has eased in recent days. “As far as winter preparations are concerned, we do not see any immediate risks to energy supplies in Europe,” said Commissioner Jorgensen: “We have been working, and are continuing to work, intensively to ensure this, in close collaboration with Member States and the sector.” Problems remain with gas storage, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, where levels are well below the 80 per cent required by EU legislation. But the biggest problem concerns prices. Gas prices remain at around 70 euros per megawatt-hour (with knock-on effects on electricity prices). Oil prices are still above 100 dollars per barrel. “This price level must not become the new normal,” said Jorgensen.

In recent months, the Commission had insisted on the need to limit national fiscal measures. But yesterday, Jorgensen had to concede the obvious: Member States have no intention of heeding Brussels’ calls to reduce demand or to provide limited, targeted aid to the most vulnerable groups. The latest example is Spain, which has extended tax rebates on fuel until December, with an automatic trigger clause to reinstate them should prices rise by more than 15 per cent. The Commission is adapting its stance. “We are examining what can be done to ensure the availability and affordability of transport fuels,” said Jorgensen: “This is a major concern for many citizens, which has repercussions for large sectors of our economy.” The possibility of extending excise duty cuts for everyone is not the only pragmatic measure promised. Jorgensen has announced an amendment to the regulation on methane emissions, as requested by the Trump administration, because the new EU rules could restrict exports of American liquefied natural gas to Europe.

It transpires that the Jewish writer Ariana Harwicz, published in Italy by Ponte alle Grazie and a nominee for the Man Booker International Prize, has been excluded from the University of Granada’s International Festival of Art and Literature. Harwicz was due to take part in a discussion dedicated to her work on 26 September. However, the invitation was withdrawn following protests by activists and university staff who discovered something extremely serious: Harwicz is opposed to the boycott of Israeli artists.

“There is a great deal of fear, not only amongst those who are expelled, but also amongst the others,” Harwicz tells El País. “You feel a great sense of loneliness and fear that they will take your books back and stop inviting you.”

He does not hesitate to accuse them of anti-Semitism. “If I belonged to another minority, no one would have done this to me. In the cultural sphere, the erasure of Jews is justified.” In Spain, as in the case of the carnival celebrations in Andorra, this can take the form of an effigy representing the State of Israel, subjected to a public ‘trial’, shot with a firearm and set alight during the festivities, which were also attended by local officials. The effigy is hanged, symbolically put on trial and sentenced to death. Or take the case of the three elderly Israeli Jewish women wearing the Star of David who were expelled from the famous Reina Sofía National Museum in Madrid. The women, one of whom was a Holocaust survivor, were attacked by some visitors shouting “child killers” and “murderers!”. Instead of removing the attackers, the museum staff asked the Jewish women to leave.

They’re talking about Zionism. “Zionist is the demonised and exploited term used to discriminate against Jews,” says Harwicz. “And they like Jews who want to destroy the State of Israel. They’re punishing me for being the ‘bad’ Jew. Why should they be the ones to decide who’s a ‘good’ Jew and who’s a ‘bad’ one? I was the only person at the festival whose articles were all scrutinised to see whether they’d let me through or not.”

Six female writers had also signed a letter calling for her dismissal to the authorities. Five hundred prominent figures from the world of culture responded with a counter-letter of protest condemning Harwicz’s dismissal, which was also signed by the renowned Spanish philosopher Fernando Savater and the former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls.

The award-winning Irish writer John Banville, published by Guanda, a Booker Prize winner and the festival’s headline act, was due to bring the festival to a close. Instead, he walked out with a single sentence: “My withdrawal was my statement”. He offered no explanation. He did not negotiate. He withdrew his own prestige from the stage. A rare gesture, because it comes at a cost. But it is almost all that, in an age of celebrity and fear, a writer can still do. The same logic has already claimed other names.

In June, a renowned far-left Israeli film director, Nadav Lapid – winner of the Berlinale (and the Jury Prize at Locarno and Cannes) – was excluded from the Marseille Film Festival, which withdrew its invitation for him to sit on the jury following pressure from pro-Palestinian actors and directors who had threatened to withdraw their films if Lapid took part.

“Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition,” said Monty Python in 1970. The pro-Pal Inquisition, however, certainly should.