He is currently writing a pamphlet to argue that there is no such thing as a ‘just’ peace, otherwise there would also be a ‘just’ war; that peace is an absolute principle of law, and therefore its opposite is nothing other than a crime; that there is no such thing as the ‘soldat inconnu’ or ‘unknown soldier’, but only the ‘missing victim’; that it is a mental illness (perhaps, but only ‘perhaps’, preferable to war) the mutual deterrence provided by dissuasive weapons – that is, the instrument that brought decades of peace following the totalitarian world wars of the last century, and ultimately the non-violent liberation of a part of the world that had been pinned down under the iron heel of political police forces and proletarian dictatorships. It is the ideology of the flotilla, the attempt to give the initiatives of the International Criminal Court the legal form of dogma; it is the platform upon which hinges all the ambiguity surrounding resistance to the European rearmament plan against Russian aggression in Ukraine and along the entire eastern front. Zagrebelsky’s ideas explain the defence of the white flag by a pope oblivious to the meaning of words, and shed light on the attribution of extreme reasonableness to Putin by a lady such as Ginevra Bompiani, who has no inkling whatsoever of the meaning of words.

‘Educare a occhio e croce’ would seem to allude, at least in the best sense of paideia, to the formation of a citizen; better still, to the intellectual—rather than emotional—construction of a mature human spirit, one that is aware of the crooked nature of humanity. It would therefore imply an introduction to politics, to the tragic sense of life, and to its painful truth—which certainly encompasses questions about war and just peace. Instead, with Zagrebelsky, one is inundated with guidelines devoid of any connection to the reality of things, all subservient to ‘oughts’, to ethical absolutes, to a disembodied and empty notion of the common good: the ‘mis-educator’, however well-intentioned, perfectly embodies – in pure paradox – the void described by Tacitus as an expression of the devastating pax romana: he creates an intellectual desert and calls it peace. Without a concept of justice, without the contractual validation of security—which provides the foundation and framework for the state and the community—and without the authorisation to defend oneself against threats, the very concept of peace is useless; and to fail to recognise this, to deny it, is highly counter-educational. Zagrebelsky’s argument is simply a eulogy to unjust peace.

What you have just read is an extract from editor-in-chief Claudio Cerasa’s newsletter, La Situa. You can subscribe here – it’s simple and free.

This view is also shared by USB, the trade union which “has 600,000 members, as we have informed the CNEL” and fills the streets in protest against the high cost of living, more so than the institutional left manages to do. “With that agreement, the minimum wage is definitively out of the picture. Instead, the ‘fair wage’ – the one Meloni spoke of in May – is recognised,” leader Guido Lutrario tells Il Foglio during a demonstration outside Palazzo Chigi. Paradoxically, and for other purposes, it is the same line being put forward by FdI’s channels: “The fair wage will be implemented”. Meanwhile, last week a USB delegation met Conte himself regarding a trade union dispute. Is dialogue underway? “We are open to talking to everyone. But we note that when they were in government, no measures were taken in the right direction. When and if they do so, we will be the first to acknowledge it. The universal basic income – concludes Lutrario – even if it is not exactly the measure we would have envisaged, has given a helping hand to those in precarious employment and low-paid work”. The (revised) universal basic income “will be part of the broad coalition’s programme”, said Stefano Patuanelli, although in reality the formula will have to be worked out (perhaps as early as today): there are various points of view.

In any case, it represents one of the M5S’s assets in the campaign for the polling booths as well. The other – and the main one – is the opposition to sending arms to Kyiv: pacifism. This is also a theme for the PD, but one that the former prime minister can downplay even when speaking of support for Ukraine. This is why some within the PD have viewed the campaign “La guerra la paghi tu” with some suspicion. The initiative – not the first to bear this title – organised in Perugia (attended by Mayor Vittoria Ferdinandi and Regional President Stefania Proietti) comes in the wake of the first round of talks on Kyiv. The second round is due to take place next Tuesday, ahead of the decisive discussions between the leaders, which will be far from straightforward. Conte filled the theatre in Perugia and, alongside his attacks on Meloni and the budget, reiterated his positions. This included the need for a minimum wage, which, however, risks being somewhat undermined by the trade union–business agreement. More fuel for discussion – and argument – on the eve of a week that could prove decisive for the broad coalition’s programme. From foreign policy, above all, to the economy and the justice system (where the issue is abuse of office). The refrain is always the same: “We will reach agreement on everything.” But will that be enough?

Everything is plugged into the mains; our lives are entirely electrified. After all, just as for Lenin communism is Soviet power plus electrification, so capitalism is free enterprise plus electrification. Now both these pillars of capitalism appear to be under threat. Neo-socialism, which sees the horror of free-market ideology in every instance of free enterprise, is gaining support and enjoying favourable press coverage and a positive social media presence. Electrification does not seem to be faring much better either; it has become the battleground for the new global war aimed at subverting the certainties of everyday life. Where will we end up if we can no longer even trust our fridge? Or, more dramatically, if we cannot even go to work without worrying that our children might be evacuated from school every day because of a bomb scare?

Our dependence on electricity is extraordinary. This was evident years ago during the unusually rare power cuts that forced us to light the proverbial candle. For a single evening, the experience was adventurous, charming, and even enjoyable—inconvenient yet romantic. Today, we are simply unable to function without electricity. It is a fact, neither good nor bad. But that is not the point.

The crux of the matter lies in our inability to withstand danger or, rather, in our intolerance of risk. This relationship with risk and danger is what, more than anything else, forms the fabric of the attacks that have struck us in recent weeks. Our societies are incapable not only of tolerating danger, but even of tolerating the threat of danger. Those who carry out these attacks know this; they are our enemies and know us well. They know where to strike; they know the very fabric of which our nightmares are made. And perhaps they despise us for this very reason.

Our nightmares are fuelled by an intolerance of risk. The threat, the shadow of what might befall us, becomes the very substance of our weakness. The level of risk we are prepared to accept in order to live has gradually diminished as risk itself has decreased. The more we have sought safety, the more our lives have been fenced in by the (illusory) certainty that black swans – absolute unforeseen events – must not exist. We have rejected the possibility that the unpredictable might be part of our lives. But this attitude has not come ‘free of charge’ in any respect.

It has not come without a financial cost, because we have channelled an ever-increasing colossal flow of money into prevention – into ensuring that every danger must be avoided at all costs: and this is the name we can give to our inefficiencies, to our hyper-regulation which stifles free enterprise (needless to say to fools, this does not mean there should be no rules). Moreover, this hyper-self-protective attitude comes at a cost, because it has made us fragile. Nassim Taleb, still on the subject of black swans, has clearly explained that whatever survives, endures and improves must be ‘anti-fragile’ – that is, capable of becoming stronger precisely because of the shocks, blows and unforeseen events it endures. It must accept danger and it must accept risk. It must also accept that some threats may materialize. Otherwise, we risk sacrificing the whole of reality on the altar of absolute safety.

The fact is, we have completely lost this ability to be anti-fragile. This is what the attacks of recent days highlight most clearly. And an increase in defence spending will not be enough to remedy the situation.

In summary, Piantedosi instructs that from now on, in the event of a mere "mass email" lacking objective evidence, schools, public or private offices, and even stations and hospitals must no longer be evacuated. One might hope that, as a liberating move, we might be able to give a good kick to the mothers interviewed by Rep. who defend their children who no longer want to go to school out of fear. It will be the sole responsibility of the relevant prefect to assess whether there are concrete grounds for risk and to order any evacuation. School heads will be required merely to report receipt of the email.

In recent days, those headteachers who decided not to send everyone home and stood their ground even in the face of frightened pupils and parents have become heroes for a day. The very same parents and media outlets that are now singing their praises were, until yesterday, accusing headteachers of irresponsibility for not closing schools due to snow warnings in neighbouring regions or strong winds. Thanks to some Putin-style incompetence, we have suddenly become a country that assesses risk with the cool-headedness of James Bond. But what if – heaven forbid (superstition should also be enshrined in the Constitution) – even a single firecracker were to go off in the corridor? Who would be held responsible for the lack of precaution? The directive requiring staff not to abandon their posts says nothing about civil or criminal liability, which by law remains with the headteachers. Will there be immunity from prosecution? And are we sure that in the most victim-centred and litigious country in the world, no one would hold it against them? In the country where geologists were put on trial for failing to predict the earthquake? Are we or are we not the family-oriented country that rejects ‘free-range parenting’ at least until the age of majority – indeed, even when ‘choosy’ students sleep in tents? But as for hoax bombs – no, we shall no longer be afraid of them.

It is a revolutionary and interesting cultural choice, to be assessed in the light of another letter. At the very moment when Piantedosi was turning us into devotees of a disregard for danger, Sergio Mattarella at the Quirinale was returning the new civil protection law, signed and promulgated, accompanied, however, by a (precautionary) letter to the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and to the Prime Minister, containing a number of prudential points.

The purpose of the amendments sought by the government to the current legislation, the 2018 Civil Protection Code, is not to grant criminal immunity (by no means!) to those involved in civil protection activities, but to narrow the circumstances under which behaviour or decisions taken during an emergency might subsequently be deemed criminal offences. For example, immunity from prosecution is introduced for offences committed through negligence, provided that the perpetrator complied with national guidelines or best practice as applicable to the specific case. Furthermore, criminal liability is limited to gross negligence, and this also applies to volunteers involved in such activities. Finally, when assessing potential negligence, the judiciary must take into account the urgency of the situation, scientific uncertainty (such as in the case of earthquakes) and the predictability of the event.

The President of the Republic has signed the bill, but wished to emphasise to the leaders of the state and the government that this constitutes “a very broad exemption from general liability for negligence” and that, furthermore, the new scope of application of the regulations is very wide. Far be it from us, or anyone else, to doubt the Head of State’s principles and his wisdom on these specific matters. Yet the country’s cultural U-turn persists. Just as was the case with criminal immunity for police officers—perceived by many as a freedom-eroding law in a country where it is often the police who end up in hospital—so too, in a country that puts meteorologists on trial, the principle of ‘reverse precaution’ must address the risk that a mayor, in emergency circumstances, might breach some regulation by making decisions that a magistrate might one day deem to be wrong. But it may well be that the ‘massive emails’ have finally forced Italians, too, to face a choice: between precaution and a sense of responsibility.

“Calenda? He needs to take some lithium,” the head of Progetto Civico – whom many, including Calenda himself, regard as a follower of Bettini – tells Il Foglio. “Take some lithium, he needs it, believe me.” Lithium aside, could you explain to us in more detail, though, what’s happening in Rome? “Gladly.”

The capital is the political incubator of the Italian left. Here, Azione councillor Alessio D’Amato defended Bettini from Calenda’s wrath. “And he was right to do so.” Is it therefore true, as has been suggested in recent days, that D’Amato was a Democratic Party ‘fifth column’? “D’Amato was an excellent administrator during Nicola Zingaretti’s term as regional governor. Excellent! And if he returns to the broad coalition, it can only be a good thing.” There you have it. Whilst you hope for that, Schlein beats the news agency to it: D’Amato is joining the PD and will contribute to the alternative. “Very good! But let’s be clear: it was Calenda who dumped him and dropped the mask.” And what was behind the mask? “Behind the mask is a man who wakes up one morning wanting to be on the left, wakes up the next day wanting to form a third pole, and opens his eyes the third day wanting to move to the right.” Do you mean he’s confused? “No. I mean he should calm down. His is a party led by a strong leader.” All right.

But what exactly is the problem with Bettini now? “It’s not a problem. It’s a complex.” Really? But is it an intellectual, social or political complex? “All sorts. Calenda accuses Goffredo of having created me.” The in vitro centre, yes. “But the truth is that he’s the one who was created in a laboratory.” But by whom? “It’s easy. By Luca Cordero di Montezemolo and Mario Monti. He was appointed as undersecretary – not elected to the Chamber of Deputies – and then promoted to minister thanks to an act of generosity on the part of Matteo Renzi.” Those were different times. By the way, how are things with Renzi? “I often criticise him, as you know. But I can’t help but give him credit for this.” For what? “For the fact that, with Calenda, Renzi was generous. In fact, extremely generous. Although to no avail.” Why to no avail? Wasn’t he a good minister in your view? “Calenda is someone who owes everything to people like Nicola Zingaretti, who wanted him as the lead candidate in the European elections, forcing the north-east to vote for him en masse. He dumps anyone who doesn’t obey him, but he owes everything to the PD’s generosity.”

For you, basically, Calenda is a saint who never breaks a sweat. But where does this famous complex stem from? “From the fact that he was thrust into power thanks to his family background. I, on the other hand, come from nothing.” Do you, like the writers of Rinascita magazine, call him a ‘Pariolo boy’ who grew up in Prati? “Excuse me, but would he ever have become a Member of the European Parliament through preferential votes?” Who can say. “I know the answer: no. He’s a PD miracle who renounces the PD. First he renounces Bettini, who founded it, then the great Franceschini, who kept it alive.” Dario the Great. “Finally, he renounces Renzi, who made him a minister. Do you know what I expect?” Go on. “That one day Calenda will renounce Montezemolo. Surely now he has a clear path to move to the right, and he’ll do it.” Who knows. What is certain is that, as we speak, the Roman councillor D’Amato is moving to the left and returning to the PD. “Good.” The leader of Azione says he’s kissing Bettini’s Thai flip-flops. “Beyond comment.” Let’s wait, then, for the commentary in Rinascita. And let’s hope for an opinion piece by Giuseppe Conte.

“A ‘South American-style measure’,” said Carlo Messina, CEO of Intesa Sanpaolo, in very harsh terms. The reference is to Article 37 of the draft bill, which spreads the Superbonus tax credits over ten years: this concerns the final ‘maxi’ instalment, amounting to 20.5 billion euros, which the government has unilaterally decided to pay not in a single year but in ten manageable instalments of around 2 billion each. For the state, the gain is minimal: no impact on the deficit, given that the credits were issued and accounted for in 2023, and therefore no additional margin to spend; but an indirect benefit of 550–600 million in reduced interest expenditure due to the avoidance of issuing 18 billion in debt in 2027. That is not much, considering that interest expenditure in 2027 will amount to 103 billion. The bill is much steeper for creditors – mainly banks – who will have to record a write-down of approximately 3 billion euros on their balance sheets.

This is a very sensitive issue, not only because of the economic consequences for the banks but also because of the reputational implications for the state. In the 3 November edition of Il Foglio, we wrote that this amounted to a ‘debt restructuring’, or in other words, a ‘default’. The Italian Banking Association (ABI), during its hearing on 10 November, aware of the sensitivity of the matter, had been more diplomatic: the measure “would appear to be tantamount to a forced restructuring of government debt”. But evidently the political class failed to grasp this. Thus, during Thursday’s hearing, Messina cut straight to the chase by evoking the scenario of an Italian default: “It is a South American-style debt management measure”. 

“It’s unbelievable,” said the CEO of Intesa Sanpaolo. In the ECB’s terminology, this is called ‘forbearance’; it is a technical measure that will lead banks to classify this as a default, with the risk that this could trigger a cross-default on all Italian government debt.” Messina outlined a scenario of extreme risk for the Treasury, precisely to emphasise that one cannot intervene so brutally on such sensitive matters. Of course, the CEO of Intesa has no interest in raising the spectre of a BTP default, given that Italian banks (and Intesa above all) are the main holders of public debt: undermining the credibility of the state as a debtor means devaluing the 600 billion in government bonds held by the bank as a creditor. The point, therefore, is that “there could have been better solutions for obtaining liquidity”, Messina emphasised.

Presumably, the bricklayer who came up with the ‘Spalma-Superbonus’ must have thought that the scheme worked in a similar way to deferred tax assets (DTAs). In that case too, after all, it involves the suspension until 2027 (in addition to those already established for 2025 and 2026) of tax deductions amounting to 2 billion. In both instances, in short, we are dealing with a state entitlement (deduction or credit) that entitles the holder to avoid paying tax on the corresponding amount. If DTAs can be deferred, then the Superbonus can also be spread out over time.

The problem, however, is that they are by no means the same thing under international accounting standards and the ECB’s supervisory rules to which banks must adhere. These are two different accounting items, with very different consequences. DTAs are classified under ‘taxes’ and their deferral does not imply the recognition of a loss. Whereas Superbonus receivables must be recorded under item 140 of the profit and loss account: ‘Gains/losses from contractual amendments without write-offs’, resulting in a write-down with implications for liquidity and, indeed, the profit and loss account. ‘Someone probably thought the impact was the same as under the rules on DTAs,’ says an expert in the field. But this is by no means the case. The damage is direct for the banks, but it could also be enormous for the state. This is because it is unclear whether accounting standards and EBA/ECB rules require banks to classify the debtor (i.e. the state) as insolvent. And one difference compared to the deferral of DTAs lies in the fact that the latter was established following an agreement with the banks, whilst the Superbonus deferral is a unilateral decision by the debtor.

The ECB was not consulted by the government on this measure. Not that there was any obligation to consult it, but this suggests that whoever drafted the legislation did not fully grasp the sensitivity of the matter and its implications, given that there was no prior consultation with either the banks or the regulatory authorities.

These critical issues had already been highlighted during a parliamentary hearing, in cautious and measured terms, by Marco Elio Rottigni, Director-General of the Italian Banking Association (ABI), but they had evidently not been taken on board. Messina was far more explicit, referring to a ‘South American-style regulation’ that risks leading the country into ‘default’. The issue, framed in these terms, was better understood, not least because it made its way into the international press and onto the radar of investors and rating agencies.

Politicians have also taken notice. “The signal to the financial markets is terrible,” says Antonio Misiani, the PD’s economic spokesperson. “The government must backtrack and scrap this provision.” But even within the government, given what is at stake, the idea of revising the provision is gaining ground. Signs to this effect have come both from Giorgetti and from yesterday’s meeting at Palazzo Chigi with the social partners. Otherwise, the matter will end up before the Constitutional Court, but with the possibility of a more immediate penalty on the markets.

In short, there is a risk that the whole thing could come crashing down. So it is high time that Giorgetti shored up the load-bearing wall before it is too late.

The crisis, the upheaval, begins on Thursday afternoon. At the very same time, in Rome, just a few metres away, Messina is being questioned by the Banking Committee and Giorgetti by the joint committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It is a scheduling error. That is how FdI views it. On the very day that Giorgetti is outlining a complex budgetary manoeuvre – the last of this parliamentary term – Messina is summoned by Forza Italia’s Pierantonio Zanettin to have his say. For the newspapers, it is a Messina-Giorgetti clash, even if only in terms of image. No one could have foreseen such an attack from Messina. No one. Four years in opposition had never done as much damage as these words: ‘South American-style regulations’. In Milan, Giuseppe Castagna, CEO of Banco BPM – the bank considered close to the Lega, which could soon merge with Crédit Agricole – is stunned. He is heard to say: “Messina has gone too far.” Another call goes out from Messina to Giorgetti. Meloni’s statement from Dublin clarifies that her immediate response had stemmed from a misunderstanding. On the phone, Messina acknowledges to Meloni that she has “restored the country’s reputation”, but also tells her that it would be a shame to lose it. 

The fallout from a misguided decision – the Superbonus, a measure that no government prior to Meloni’s had the courage to halt – has led to the most serious incident of this parliamentary term: a dispute between the Prime Minister and Italy’s most prominent banker. To reduce the debt, Giorgetti is spreading the Superbonus liabilities over ten years. This is hitting the banks – institutions that have already faced a tax increase, justified by the exceptional profits of recent years, a period of governmental stability. It is a rule that is now being removed, merely ‘a temporary measure’, as Giorgetti would put it. Messina’s target is Giorgetti, his party (to what extent is unclear), and the Lega. The Italian Banking Association (ABI) and the CEOs of the credit institutions that look to Messina for guidance speak of ‘aggressiveness’ on the part of the Lega – behaviour that, for Messina, is typical of ‘bullies’. It is this unease that prompts Messina to intervene. Paradoxically, the opportunity is provided by the government itself: the Banking Commission. The misguided phrase that irritates Messina, they say, is ‘debt consolidation’, a phrase used by the Minister for the Economy. For the banks, it smacks of Argentina and is causing anxiety on the international markets. For Meloni’s party, however, Messina’s response comes across as ungrateful. Marco Osnato, the chairman of the Finance Committee from FdI, says that ‘the tone used is surprising. We would have preferred to agree with the banks as much as possible, but we are certain that, in the end, the sacrifices made by the banks will have repercussions on their customers’ interests. As for the accusation of being ‘South American’, I don’t know whether Messina was referring to Lula or Milei.” The speculation is so sinister that some in the majority are venturing the idea that Corriere della Sera is shifting to the left, the start of an attack: banks and newspapers. There is a sense of extremely powerful hostile forces in the air, and there are even those who are smiling. They say that when Salvini heard Messina speak, he remarked: “Here’s a victory for the League – see, we were right, weren’t we?”

Anyone phoning Messina to gauge the atmosphere within the government is told that relations with Meloni are excellent, though less so with the others in the government. The name ‘Giancarlo’ – Giorgetti – comes up again. Messina speaks to him very late in the evening, after speaking to Meloni. They are both extremely shrewd players and both claim it was merely hyperbole on the part of the newspapers. They are playing it down. Messina points out that the debt is nothing more than the placement of government bonds and that if certainty is lost, the spreads will go haywire. A bewildered Tajani tries to intervene, to step in, because ‘sacrifices are never pleasant, but there was no other way’. Forza Italia tries to take credit for the amendment to the bonus spread. The entire Budget Bill is on the table. Trade unions are summoned to Palazzo Chigi. The leader of the UIL, Bombardieri, emerges and announces that ‘the cuts’ to education and healthcare have been scrapped. Meloni is forced to explain in a video that it was not a cut. Even basic courtesy goes out the window. Ignazio La Russa also speaks out against Messina, ‘because describing a budget as “South American” is offensive. To South America’. There is another shocking remark from Messina that opens up new possibilities: his call for the government not to view the banks as an ‘ATM’. He suggests looking elsewhere: “It’s not just the banks that have made profits. There are many sectors, not just the energy sector.” This comes across as a call to tax state-owned companies – Enel, Eni – managed by Claudio Descalzi and Flavio Cattaneo. It is the extremely dangerous scenario of everyone against everyone, and a new player is emerging: the PD, the left. The likely next Minister for the Economy, Francesco Boccia, has indicated that amendments will be tabled to “adjust the bonus spread” and that these will be cross-party amendments, whilst adding that Messina’s words “are correct”. If a single remark by Messina has caused a “shockwave”, what does his overture to the left amount to, just a few months before the elections? Claudio Durigon, the League’s strongman, says that “the right has agreed to and asked the banks to make a sacrifice, but the left, I would remind you, is in favour of a wealth tax”. Which left? Claudio Mancini, a PD MP who was almost a de facto Minister for the Economy during the Conte II government, with Gualtieri at the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), sides with Messina: “Messina is right; he’s right about everything. The ‘bonus-spreading’ rule is an absurd piece of legislation. It’s Giorgetti’s headbutt, a bit like Zidane’s. Giorgetti lost 4–0 on the Intesa-Unipol-MPS-BPM issue and committed a foul in retaliation. The minister must explain why he prevented Unicredit from taking over BPM; he must explain his close relationship with Lovaglio. I also recall that there is an investigation by the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Banking Committee will remain in place and, over the coming years, will serve to shed light on Giorgetti’s actions”. New in-house tribunals are being prepared for a new era. The PD has found ‘comrade’ Messina, and Messina already has a party ready to amend the rules in his favour. Mancini adds: “We can win the elections. And the problem is starting to get serious.”

Since 2019, the healthcare company’s expansion beyond national borders has ultimately become the driving force behind Italy’s foreign policy image in Africa and the Middle East. All this under the leadership of Ghribi, the businessman born in Tunisia – where people are already wondering whether this step back might herald a renewed bid for the presidency in Tunis – who made his fortune in the United States and Switzerland. So much so that there is now talk of Italy’s ‘health diplomacy’ – the kind that builds hospitals which become exclusive healthcare hubs and generate enormous sums of money. These range from the Benghazi healthcare centre – with a staggering market value of 2 billion dollars – to investments in the New Heliopolis Hospital in Cairo, the Al Najaf Al Ashraf Teaching Hospital in Najaf, Iraq, the Basra Hospital and, more recently, the Italian hospital in Baghdad, in the very heart of the Iraqi capital. Additional projects include 15 hospitals to be built in Kenya for over $400 million, social housing initiatives in Gabon, a multispecialist hospital in Tirana, and a waste-management project in Albania. All of these initiatives fall under the umbrella of GKSD Holding, the consultancy firm chaired by Ghribi, which serves as the operational arm of the San Donato Group for overseas investments. Often working hand in hand with the Mattei Plan, but also acting as a trailblazer and always using its own capital, drawing on high-level, cross-party connections.

This is appreciated by Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani and also by the head of the foreign intelligence services, Giovanni Caravelli. The latter gave his blessing to dealings with the Haftars in Libya by attending – without ever clarifying in what capacity – the signing of the memorandum for the construction of the hospital in Benghazi. Every year, in his capacity as founder and president of the think tank ECAM (European Council for Africa and the Middle East), Ghribi acts as host to virtually all of Africa’s leaders, whose propensity for authoritarianism at home ends up being swept under the carpet amidst the red carpets of the ECAM Summit in New York, now in its eighth edition. Alongside Ghribi at these events is often Tajani himself, as well as the highly regarded Ambassador Ettore Sequi, secretary-general of ECAM and a member of the board of directors of the Vita-Salute San Raffaele University. The question now is what will become of this ‘parallel Foreign Office’ and of all the memoranda signed without interruption by Ghribi over so many years. “There will be a radical change of direction,” promise sources close to the new board of directors, and indeed the intention announced by Marco Rotelli is to return to the San Donato Group’s core business: the Italian healthcare sector and research. If the Group were indeed to return to prioritising investments within Italy’s borders, many partners who had so far opened channels of dialogue with Rome precisely thanks to Ghribi might take a harder line. For example, in Benghazi, where the chairman of the Libyan Reconstruction Fund, Belqasim Haftar, is unlikely to have welcomed Ghribi’s departure with open arms.

At present, Alberto Bagnai has taken up a post at the Competition Authority, whilst Giulio Centemero, another member of the Lega, has joined Consob. Next autumn, the terms of office at Agcom and the Data Protection Authority will expire. It’s a real feast of appointments. Nicola Dell’Acqua, who is close to FdI, has been appointed chair of Arera; another figure close to the party is Lorenza De Marco (a member of the board). Of course, there is also the PD quota. Also sitting on ARERA is Alessandro Bratti (a Franceschini supporter), whilst another is Livio De Santoli (M5S quota). Tajani also has his own representative: Francesca Salvemini, former head of Pichetto’s technical secretariat. At AGCOM, it should be noted that there is another League member, Capitanio, alongside Giacomelli, who represents the PD. At the Data Protection Authority, there is Ghiglia, from FdI. The name for ANAC will be announced at the next Council of Ministers meeting. Salvini assures us that he has the name and that it is top secret. Unassailable. Times have changed: an authority to be appointed is always better than a seat to be won.

Drafting a coalition programme is no easy task, although it is by no means an insurmountable challenge; however, trying to focus on a few key points can be useful when considering a crucial question: on what basis can the next elections be won? Let us proceed in an orderly fashion and consider five key elements.

Firstly. The most burdensome legacy of the neoliberal era is the staggering increase in social inequality over recent decades. Between 2010 and 2025, 91 per cent of the increase in national wealth went to the richest 5 per cent of households, whilst the poorest half received just 2.7 per cent. In Italy, this phenomenon comes on top of thirty years of stagnant wages and productivity. This situation does not merely concern the living conditions of workers, women, pensioners and young people with no future: it calls into question the very stability of the democratic system and the very foundations of a community. The primary driver of insecurity — let the right take this to heart — lies in the conviction, felt by the majority of people, that a life of hardship, with no hope of redemption, is inevitable. Anger inevitably springs from the outrage provoked by waste, the vulgar display of wealth, tax evasion, and indifference towards the vulnerable, the weak and the less fortunate. The centre-left must raise the debate on social justice to this level. It is both a partisan demand and a powerful call for national responsibility, one that concerns the entire Italian ruling class, for it is the very stability of the Republic that is at stake. If selfishness and the centrifugal forces of those seeking more or less lawful enrichment prevail, chaos, disintegration and violence will increase. The Meloni government is behaving irresponsibly. It is not tackling large fortunes, unearned income or tax evasion – which should be targeted – and is instead handing out petty pre-election handouts. Italy must, therefore, recognise that, even within the context of an economy that is hyper-connected to the world and subject to European budgetary rules that we wish to change, every one of our efforts, actions, measures and government solutions will be rooted in the circumstances and perspectives of our citizens. From the minimum wage to the reversal of the tax drag on earned income and pensions. From the fight against job insecurity to ensuring that public procurement contracts are awarded to businesses that apply the collective agreements signed by the most representative trade unions. I could go on. And this will not be dictated by the interests – all too often presented as objective – of concentrated, oligarchic economic and financial powers. Italian voters must understand which side we are on. Of course, the feasibility and speed of change will not be entirely in our hands. But setting the direction of travel certainly is. Resources must be sought where wealth is concentrated: combating tax evasion, reforming inheritance tax on large estates, and rebalancing the tax burden between investment income and earned income.

Secondly. For the centre-left, embracing this prospect of real change means overturning a completely far-fetched notion of reformism, which has also taken root within our own camp. Reformism is, historically speaking, the project of achieving an improvement in the people’s living conditions through democratic struggle and republican institutions. The ‘zero hour’ of revolution and the maximalism of abstract, ideological confrontation are a thing of the past. The choice is to operate in a granular, gradual yet determined manner, gaining ground in various fields. Unfortunately, from 1989 onwards, reformism has gradually come to be understood in an entirely different way, even amongst democrats. No longer is it the expression, in the forms just described, of a social impulse arising from the heart of society, but rather the stifling of such impulses, based on the requirements of a social and productive order now deemed the only one possible. Reformism characterised by ‘compatibility’, austerity, the sanctification of spending caps and budgets, iron-fisted discipline for the vulnerable, and the transnational freedom of capital, finance and tax evasion. Our difficulties with the people stem from this misunderstanding of the word reformism: it has become a blunt weapon against the Left, capable of transforming every protest into populism, every social wound into a demand for welfare, and every disorienting sense of isolation into laziness, antisocial behaviour, indifference and a lack of character.

“Our difficulties with the people stem from a misunderstanding of the word ‘reformism’. Change is possible”

Thirdly. The points made form the basis for the unity of our camp. However, they are not sufficient. We need to answer a question that is more relevant than ever: why is it that the right-wing led by Giorgia Meloni, despite having governed so poorly, is faltering but not collapsing? Its failure to deliver results does not seem to be undermining a deep-seated core that remains resilient. This resilience, I argue, stems from the fact that despite their failures, our opponents have managed to leave a stubborn imprint on the Italian psyche. Not through politics. But through metapolitics. Not through the listing of policies. Rather, through metaphors – that is to say, the true language of the political mind. Their metaphor is ‘I will protect you’. It isn’t true, of course. Yet the conviction remains. I’ll protect you from immigrants, from street violence, from European regulations, from taxes, from the actions of judges, from the meddling of a left that wants to undermine your stability. However, you must accept a certain institutional and social model. In short: hierarchies. Those at the top and those at the bottom. You will bear the weight of feeling your superior’s heel pressing down on your head, but you will have the satisfaction of being able to press your own heel onto the head of those subordinate to you. It is an age-old means of silencing the anguish of existence. Vannacci is a sort of centrifuged smoothie of this world view. It produces lives that are shattered, hollowed out, inauthentic. And yet, it is a political ‘form’. A worldview. A response – for us, a poisonous and deceitful one – to the disintegration and chaos of modernity. What has been our response? ‘Forms’ must be answered with other ‘forms’.

“Our opponents have managed to leave a lasting impression on the hearts and minds of Italians. Now it’s our turn”

In response to one vision of the world, we must imagine a different vision of the world. In the face of points of reference that provoke our indignation, we must establish other points of reference as credible alternatives. But since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Left, amidst the rubble, has left behind not only unsustainable and, not infrequently, criminal regimes. It has left behind the confidence to critique the present. We have been on the defensive. We have generally governed well, saving many cities and the entire Republic. We have, however, operated within the broad parameters set by others. We have sailed close to the wind, heeling the boat beyond measure. And today we still lack a shared vision – a shared idea of the future. To achieve this, we would need to swiftly change a fundamental stance that we have gradually adopted over the years. To build our own alternative form, just as in a person’s development, a process of ‘individuation’ is needed. That is what Jung called it. At a certain point, the child, having moved beyond the phase of curiosity about everything and a voracious appetite for the world, begins to understand what truly resonates within them – their talents and predispositions. It is not a matter of accumulating, but rather of pruning. This also applies to a political entity. We have absorbed, incorporated and accumulated a great deal: new ideas, innovation, desires. As a result, our forms have become distorted. Everything has become mixed up into a muddled mess. An alternative society, if it is to be such, must instead choose, select and define its boundaries. Boundaries confer identity. Without boundaries, there is not even the possibility of engaging in dialogue with others. Of including others. Of creating the opportunity for an encounter, for mutual influence. Admittedly, these are boundaries opposed to those of the New Right. But without boundaries, one is submerged in the indistinctness of extreme consumerism, of the polished world of appearances, of the inauthentic realm of social masks and fashionable behaviour. Without borders, Europe itself could not open up to the Mediterranean, to the other great cultures that have crossed and shaken it. It could not access that ‘meridian’ way of thinking that comes to life in the most uncertain hours of dawn and dusk; where mutual borders touch and embrace one another; in favour of a gentler, more peaceful, more thoughtful encounter between different peoples.

Fourth. But what is our vision of an alternative world? The right wing offers reassurance by confining people’s lives within pyramidal structures. Our world, on the contrary, must expand the life that still yearns for life. We need days capable of weaving together rest, play, artistic and cultural enjoyment, work, family, loved ones and friends. Even boredom. If the essence of our message becomes: a better life for everyone, founded on the miracle of existence, on the privilege of possessing the talents granted only to us, then we might be able to reconstruct the idea of another world. Then we might be able to address the unease of those who do not feel listened to, cared for or protected. Forget crippling hierarchies. Instead, unexpressed life that becomes authentic life, welcomed and respected.

Fifth. Naturally, nothing will be possible without peace. Berlinguer once said: ‘If there is no peace, there is nothing left afterwards’. The world, divided into two blocs, maintained a balance between the two superpowers that was capable of averting war. They were bitter adversaries, yet they sought coexistence, called for disarmament, encouraged diplomacy and calculated the balance of missile forces. Great ruling classes who felt the responsibility of holding in their hands weapons of mass destruction, capable of wiping out our species. In 1963, Togliatti delivered an inspired speech, in harmony with the views of John XXIII, in which he asserted that, above and beyond class and ideological conflicts, the fate of humanity was at stake. A shared reflection was therefore imperative. Today, the word ‘peace’ seems to have vanished. Western ruling classes, and indeed European ones too, have replaced it with: final victory, rearmament, hatred of the adversary. We were absolutely right to help Ukraine – treacherously invaded by the autocrat Putin – including with military aid. But alongside that aid, we should have immediately pushed for negotiations, to end the conflict, to impose peace, and to work towards a compromise that did not justify the aggressor’s motives, but sought to understand them within the context of previous historical events. Europe has done the exact opposite. It has fanned the flames of belligerence. It has portrayed Russia as the embodiment of evil. It has compared Putin to Hitler. It has instilled fear in Europeans. And as Nazism has shown us, the fear of aggression – even if imaginary – fosters and paves the way for war. Europe has failed in its traditional role as a land of peace, a bridge between East and West, and a benevolent link in a multipolar world. It now finds itself silent, embarrassed, and even incapable of appointing a single representative to mediate between the two combatants. If action is to be taken—as I hope it will be—the key players will be China, America, and Russia. The desired outcome is a truce. Almost a million young people have fallen on the battlefield between Russia and Ukraine. The truce along the front line must be accompanied by a border zone protected by international forces, and, as soon as possible, a conference must be convened – similar to the Helsinki Conference – capable of guaranteeing security throughout that region of the world. This mutual security can only be achieved if, in ways yet to be determined, Europe’s intervention is guaranteed should Russia attack again in the future, and if Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is secured within a reasonable timeframe. Conversely, there must be a commitment not to extend NATO to Russia’s borders – one of the factors that triggered the aggression. If none of this comes to pass, sending further weapons for an endless war – which will ultimately, and inevitably, become nuclear – no longer makes sense. If, on the other hand, we embark on a virtuous process, in which Europe can play a leading role, whilst that process unfolds, it would make sense to supply Ukraine with defensive weapons – capable of intercepting enemy munitions – to prevent surprise attacks whilst peace negotiations are underway.

“We were absolutely right to help Ukraine with arms as well. But now is the time for negotiations.”

A final conclusion. We have chosen to counter the right with a broad alliance. The left cannot win on its own. It only had the chance to do so in the mid-1970s. But Berlinguer said that 51 per cent would not be enough to govern. And he proposed the ‘historic compromise’. A broad alliance must make all its components feel at home, including an innovative, socialist, republican and civic centre. Each component must be able to express its own distinct identity and rally its own electorate, without friction between groups. At the same time, all must be driven by a unified mission, a spirit of struggle and hope capable of winning over the electorate as a whole. It requires surgical precision, attention to detail, and the finesse of embroidery. And at the same time, it requires a steady hand and strategic direction. We have decided on a path that should define a shared programme. We are not starting from scratch. We have also chosen the route of primaries to select our leader. Perhaps other options were available. But that is how it is. Today, they must be conducted to the highest standard. We must avoid rifts, conflicts between parties, and crude clashes between the strongest personalities. It is obvious that the PD as a whole has endorsed Schlein’s candidacy. She fully deserves it. Just as the Five Star Movement has endorsed Conte’s, with whom we have governed very effectively together. But if the primaries were to be limited to mobilising the parties, activists and leaders, they would amount to very little. They would betray the spirit of an electoral contest aimed at citizens, at the people; a contest whose purpose is to gauge support for whoever is to lead the coalition, having the greatest authority and the best chance of victory. This internal process of ours is important. But it must not be overemphasised, nor should it be imbued with a decisive significance that does not belong to our culture, our tradition, or our rejection of the electoral and institutional model envisaged by the right. A system based on plebiscites, top-down decision-making and centred on the figure of the Prime Minister. For this reason, everyone must step out of their own little patch – the one where we stamp our feet so much without taking a single step forward. We must raise our sights to the decisive issue: winning the next general election.

“If the primaries were merely to mobilise the parties, their activists and their leaders, they would amount to very little indeed”

If Meloni were to win, she would establish a regime. She would take everything, including the President of the Republic, dismantling the very bulwark of safeguards and freedom that has enabled the Republic to endure. At the age of 74, after 60 years of activism, far removed from management and any form of power, I have, together with a group of friends, revived the old and glorious publication Rinascita. Rinascita will leave each of its contributors free to vote in the primaries as they see fit. Its role is not to take sides, but to offer contributions, in-depth analysis and insights to make progressives stronger and more combative. Whereas in the past Italian communists used to invoke the hope of not dying as Christian Democrats, today our hope is not to perish within the disturbing clump of a right-wing that uses the symbols of the past to act, in the present, as the real obstacle to full human freedom.

But for the secretary, the agreement is a good one. Might the leader of Italy’s largest trade union have something different to say about an agreement that leaves it to the confederations to determine, through collective bargaining, what constitutes a fair wage? Yet as early as this morning, Landini had reverted to being a militant trade unionist rather than a government-aligned one. Although yesterday he assured everyone that once his term at the CGIL is over he will ‘retire’, this morning he was already back in Piazza Montecitorio, just a metre from Palazzo Chigi, to present the CGIL’s tax reform: the reversal of the tax drag and a solidarity levy on the richest 1 per cent, totalling 26 billion, ‘more than the government’s budget’. He then attacked the Budget Bill, calling it “absurd” and full of “electoral handouts”. Finally, he announced the general strike against the government on Friday 20 November: “Even more certain now”. For someone about to retire from politics, that was quite a rally. Shortly afterwards, in the early afternoon, at Palazzo Chigi, the government met with the social partners to discuss the budget. But Landini did not attend: he had “another commitment” – a meeting with international trade union delegations. The government’s approach, he explained, “is laughable”: summoning everyone to discuss a budget that had already been presented. Representing the CGIL was a delegation from the secretariat, with the very same proposals they had just outlined in the square. The meeting was just a stone’s throw away, but the secretary had already made his point.

The situation is as follows. Yesterday in agreement with the government, today against it. Yesterday a pensioner-in-waiting, today on the front line. A direct confrontation, for now, is off the cards. The pensioner can wait. The agenda, clearly, cannot.

With the PD, yes, but not with Bettini, who is one of the party’s top leaders. There is therefore great confusion within Azione. But this Roman affair should not be dismissed as a mere local dispute, because it is a symptom of something deeper afoot. A centrifugal effect – not so much a side effect – of the new electoral law, which rewards parties that form coalitions. According to the latest polls, in fact, both the centre-right and the centre-left are exceeding the crucial 42 per cent threshold required to secure the majority bonus, and this means that Azione – Il Centro, which according to the latest ‘Porta a Porta’ survey stands at around 5 per cent – like the other centrist parties, for that matter – is no longer indispensable. Consequently, an increasing number of centrists are pushing for an alliance with either the left or the right. The first to make waves was Luigi Marattin who, at odds with the president of the Liberal Democrats, Andrea Marcucci – whilst he himself is the party’s secretary – is seeking dialogue with a ‘centre-right which – as he told this newspaper – is trying to move towards liberalism; that is no small matter’.

Among those pushing to align with the centre-left is, in fact, D’Amato. The events of the last few hours have added another chapter to the saga between the secretary of Azione and the former Democrat, which reached its climax two days ago over a dual issue that, in Rome, is effectively a single one: an alliance with the centre-left and Goffredo Bettini. In the pages of this newspaper, D’Amato had taken a different line from his secretary precisely on the issue of supporting Roberto Gualtieri’s bid for a second term as mayor of the capital, playing down Calenda’s statements, which had been very clear: “No alliance”. Zingaretti’s former regional councillor, however, had softened his tone, pointing out that he had been working for almost a year towards a possible alliance and stating that, should talks take place with Gualtieri, Azione “would certainly not fail to contribute to the formulation of a programme for the city of Rome”.

The disagreements came to the fore when Calenda described the long-standing leader of the PD, Bettini himself, as “one of the great evils of the left”. D’Amato then felt compelled to rush to the defence of his former colleague with a strongly worded statement: “Debate, even the most heated, should never descend into personal attacks. When that happens, it means we have all lost out a little”His leader, speaking again on SkyTg 24 whilst emphasising the distance between himself and Bettini, did not rule out dialogue with the current mayor of Rome: “Let me be very clear: Gualtieri is doing some things well; others I would have done differently. In my view, he is someone with whom we must be able to engage in dialogue. With Bettini, it’s a different story altogether. We’ve never had anything to do with him and we don’t want to have anything to do with him.” The first effects of Calenda’s decision are already being felt: the former president of the Lazio Regional Council and MEP, Guido Milana – until today a national leader of Azione – has in fact decided to leave the party: “I’m not staying a minute longer in a party that makes decisions via tweets,” he stated on his Facebook page. 

A situation similar to that of D’Amato occurred just a month ago involving Giacomo Leonelli, former secretary of Azione per l’Umbria and currently sole director of Adisu, the Agency for the Right to University Education. On 9 October, Leonelli had indirectly responded to Calenda by writing in X that “the secretary still declares ‘never with the broad coalition’. In the vast majority of towns and regions, Azione governs or has been allied with the centre-left. It is therefore appropriate to consult members and administrators in a formal consultation on this stance of outright rejection’. Following his remarks, Calenda stated that Leonelli was not a member of Azione and had spoken on his own behalf.

However, this dichotomy between the centrist national stance and the various local agendas is causing some difficulties for local administrators when it comes to being accountable to their constituents. This is precisely because, at local level, alliances between individual branches vary. Lorenzo Mazzanti, the new commissioner for Azione in Umbria – appointed following Leonelli’s new role – explains, in an attempt to untangle this complicated situation, that the party line is more or less clear: “At national level, we are all firmly aligned behind a centrist list. Whereas, both in the past and in future decisions, at local level we are given considerable leeway for individual representatives to make their own decisions. I am thinking of our region, where we have entered into agreements with the centre-left.” The same approach has been adopted in some major cities such as Genoa and Perugia. Commenting on Rome, Mazzanti – whilst describing D’Amato’s actions as a “rush forward, a risky move” – remains convinced that “the agreement with Gualtieri will eventually go ahead, but it has not yet been finalised”. Among those looking to the centre-left is also the Campania group of Azione, which supports the broad coalition in the region. Indeed, the former regional secretary, Giuseppe Sommese, recalled how his group had worked alongside the centre-left for five years during the previous council term and “therefore, at the last regional elections, the majority of councillors decided to make the same choice again in full knowledge of the facts, whilst maintaining cordial relations with the party”. 

However, amongst the local branches of Azione that would not be averse to an agreement with the centre-right, the Piedmontese branch certainly stands out. Just two weeks ago, the regional secretary Daniela Ruffino, responding to the liberal appeal by Forza Italia’s governor Alberto Cirio, told Il Foglio that “dialogue in the Regional Council is by no means complicated and there is considerable common ground in Parliament too. ‘It is on the basis of liberal principles that we are seeking allies, and we are open to dialogue.’ In Calabria as well, judging by the tone, there are Calendian supporters pushing for an alliance with the centre-right, such as Marco Lombardo, a Calabrian senator from Azione, who, speaking to Il Foglio, said that “Occhiuto is governing well; he has provided a much-needed shake-up. And we are interested in his approach within Forza Italia.” Regional secretary Francesco De Nisi shares this view: “We will engage in dialogue with everyone: with the more liberal wing of the centre-right and with the reformist wing of the centre-left,” the senator concludes, “but it is a fact that the former carries far more weight than the latter.”

The legislation spreads the Superbonus tax credits – which banks could have used in 2027 – over ten years, thereby postponing the point at which the credit institutions that purchased those credits can recoup them. In Messina, before the committee of inquiry into the banking system, he had branded it as a South American-style approach to managing debt towards creditors, raising the spectre of debt restructuring and default, and had deemed it inconsistent with the Constitution.

Giorgetti began by saying ‘amusing’, and then conceded to the banker that the measure had been described as ‘South American’, adding: ‘and rightly so’. But he recalled the figures. The debt rescheduling concerns 23–24 billion in loans, whilst a Habsburg-style minister took it upon himself to absorb 140 billion in Superbonuses into the state budget: without that burden, he said, the debt-to-GDP ratio would have fallen to 132 per cent. And so, he concluded, “I stand by the Habsburg-style policy of these past four years”. The reference is to the bureaucracy of the Habsburg Empire, synonymous with rigour and sound financial management.

Giorgetti’s response came on the same day as the fiercest clash, that between Messina and Giorgia Meloni. Speaking at the European Political Community summit in Dublin, the Prime Minister had replied that the measures in the budget were not ‘South American’ in nature, and that the government’s decision was one of justice. Later that evening, Palazzo Chigi clarified that Meloni had understood that Messina was referring to the budget as a whole, and not to the provision on the Superbonus, to which, incidentally, some amendments are currently being made.

Ultimately, the banker and the Minister for the Economy agree on one point: that rule is, in fact, South American. The difference is that, for Giorgetti, it is the price of a Superbonus that he did not want. Tonight, S&P’s assessment of Italy’s credit rating will reveal what the markets think.

According to Corrado Formigli, leader of Futuro Nazionale, the Constitution “is anti-monarchist, not anti-fascist. Article 139 states that the republican form of government is the only acceptable one and that the re-establishment of that dissolved fascist party is prohibited”.

The re-organisation, in any form whatsoever, of the dissolved Fascist party is prohibited. Notwithstanding Article 48, temporary restrictions on the right to vote and on eligibility for election shall be laid down by law, for a period not exceeding five years from the entry into force of the Constitution, in respect of those responsible for the Fascist regime.

The former general added: “The values of the Resistance are, in part, those that shaped Italy, so I don’t see why I should renounce them. But I recall that Italy was liberated more by the Allied forces than by the Resistance. Freedom and democracy, certainly, but anti-fascism is not a value and is not mentioned in the Constitution; there is no article that refers to it.” “Would you define fascism as an absolute evil, as Gianfranco Fini did?” asked the presenter of *Piazzapulita*. “No,” replied Vannacci. 

The issue of the Constitution not being anti-fascist is a ‘long-standing’ one that was first introduced into public debate by a section of the political class within the Italian Social Movement as early as the mid-1950s. In April 2023, it was Ignazio La Russa who brought the subject up again, stating to La Repubblica that ‘there is no reference to anti-fascism in the Constitution’. Indeed, the only reference to the fascist regime is contained in Article XII of the Constitution; however, as the legal scholar Stefano Rodotà wrote, ‘it is reductive to focus solely on the number of times the term “fascism” appears in the Constitution. The very first article – “Italy is a democratic Republic, founded on work. Sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it in the forms and within the limits of the Constitution’, is a clear indication that the fascist regime has been overcome”.

In recent days, Grillo has sent out a few signals. The latest came yesterday, in the pages of this newspaper, addressed directly to Giuseppe Conte. “Can he go to the Quirinale? He’s capable of anything,” replied the founder of the M5S, who will return to television on Sunday 22nd, on Fabio Fazio’s programme. In September, he met Stroppa, Musk’s representative in Italy. He does not rule out a return to the political fray, perhaps to offer a response to those disappointed by the Five Star Movement’s new direction, joining forces with Matteo Renzi and what was once his main target: the much-hated PD. In Via di Campo Marzio, within the M5S, they are putting on a calm front. They are not overly concerned, bolstered by the vote of members at the end of 2024 which abolished the role of the guarantor, bringing the Grillo era to a close. They are also convinced that the legal case over the party symbol will not go far.

However, over the past week, that poll on Di Battista’s association has also stirred things up. According to Ipsos, taking a stand could be worth around 3 per cent, with potential reaching up to 13 per cent and the ability to attract a section of the current M5S electorate – in a dynamic similar to that which Grillo might set in motion. Such a move would have repercussions for the entire opposition. After all, Dibba himself has admitted that thoughts have turned to the 2027 general election. “We’d taken all the necessary steps to be ready, then something unexpected happened,” he told La7, with a smile. “What I’ll be doing over the coming months is trying to heal and strengthen the organisation so that, when the time comes to make decisions, I can do so with a clear head and choose without any preconceptions.” This has also given rise to the suggestion – the hypothesis – of an electoral alliance between Schierarsi and Grillo. But the Genoese comedian is said to harbour some mistrust and doubts about Dibba’s political project. And if he were to return to the political arena at all, he would prefer to do so with other allies. One less thing for Conte to worry about. Or perhaps two more – and by no means insignificant ones. (rdm)

The scene. The Green Room. Palazzo Chigi. Meloni, standing in the doorway, welcomes the opposition. Calenda kisses her hand (this scene will be cut during post-production). At the government table: Fazzolari, Ciriani, Piantedosi, Tajani, Meloni, Salvini, Crosetto and Mantovano. On the other side: Schlein, Conte, Fratoianni, Bonelli, Calenda, Magi, Steger (representing linguistic minorities) and Ziello, Vannacci’s deputy. Seated. Piantedosi explains that “we cannot hire hackers because we would have to pay them as top-tier executives”. Renzi, who received a call from Agnese (“it’s not on that my wife should ring and say: ‘they’re evacuating’ because we’re missing an antivirus programme”), points out that he was the first to invest in cyber security. Conte takes the floor: “And I set up the COR.” Calenda knows this: “It was the Russians, Putin.” Bonelli interjects: “Mr President, we won’t stop hackers with cannons.” Meloni replies: “Well, say that this too is defence – why don’t you say so?” She wants to take the floor in the Chamber, turn the briefing into a formal statement, put it to a vote, and challenge those who “lie about defence”. Trust me, in two years’ time we’ll have a parliamentary anti-spam committee.

This is how it will end, as Meloni has already announced during talks with the opposition: the ACN, led by the highly capable professional Andrea Quacivi – formerly of Sogei – will be strengthened. The outcome will feature cybersecurity experts appearing on television, while Meloni remains in Parliament. She intends to refute all the ‘nonsense’ about cuts to cybersecurity and to respond to those—such as Franco Gabrielli, the former Chief of Police, who is increasingly likely to stand in the primaries—who mock her: ‘When will the anti-Misoginistan decree be issued?’. They have tried sitting around the table, shaking hands, but the rhetoric ends up in the election manifestos. Even the very image of this table is a victory for the fools, for the pirates. Riccardo Magi says when he takes the floor: ‘What a spectacle we’re making of ourselves! What might anyone seeing us sitting here today think? That they’ve won.’ They might think that a raspberry is more dangerous than a fighter-bomber. Meloni thanks them for their cooperation, but the spell is broken by Conte, who is the most stern in reminding them of the cuts to cyber-security. But what cuts? Meloni and Mantovano ask themselves, exchanging glances. Conte points out that he had left the Ministry of Innovation, but “unfortunately, you’ve dismantled it. We need a single coordination body for all intelligence agencies”. Meloni retorts: “If you’ve done everything right, why are we here?”

Mantovano lists the figures for closed schools and points out that, out of over six thousand alerts, nearly 1,800 schools – and therefore headteachers – plucked up the courage, kept their cool and kept the schools open. No one, not even Schlein – who is the most diligent and has done her homework – manages to address the real dilemma: who bears responsibility for closing schools, and to whom? According to Schlein, ‘if we have to buy systems from the Americans instead of developing our own, we increase our dependence and go from the frying pan into the fire’. Edoardo Ziello of Futuro Nazionale – the Vannacciano who has put forward a sound proposal to expand the role of the digital transition officer – remarked as soon as he stepped out: ‘Schlein brought her notes with her, and they were so densely written that you couldn’t even read them’. As usual, it is Renzi who injects the most painful barb: “Who is responsible for cyber-security? Foreign Affairs, the Home Office? The intelligence services or the ACN?” He hits the nail on the head regarding this endless dispute between Crosetto and Mantovano over the intelligence services. Crosetto is the most honest when he admits: “We don’t have any hackers. The ones we do have don’t come to work for us.”

The Ministry of Defence considered: “Do you know who we could use? Those individuals we’ve arrested, who are currently in prison. We could put them to work and have them serve their sentences. But would the opposition agree?”. A year ago already, Crosetto, in his report to the Defence Committee on 25 January 2025, noted that “an actor with limited resources can inflict significant damage on states’ critical infrastructure”, and his draft bill on a cyber authority is also before the Senate. If the left wants a single authority, why doesn’t it use the draft bill as a starting point? It does not, because, as Fratoianni puts it, “we don’t want ‘friends of friends’ in these agencies”. The emergency fizzles out into political patronage, as seen at the RAI, and gradually into a “oh well, let’s not get carried away” attitude. Calenda, in a moment of levity, asks Bonelli this question: “Just out of curiosity, do you ride a horse?”

Piantedosi compares the Misoginistan emails “to the letters pupils used to send at school in our day”, and links these warnings to 17 October. Bonelli hears this and pounces: “So you’re linking these incidents together? Is that what you’re doing?”. The Ministry of Defence responds to the left’s accusations by stating that 8 billion has been earmarked from 2019 to 2040 to counter the hybrid threat. The two-and-a-half-hour session concludes with Meloni covering her ground: “You can’t go out and say we have no proposals.” Schlein retorts that “you do have them, but they’re ours.” Salvini remains silent throughout the meeting, and it is a silence that is unnerving. Fazzolari’s silence is that of a man in command.

Anyone leaving the room learns that, on the world stage, Carlo Messina of Intesa SanPaolo has just attacked the government, that Giorgetti describes himself as a ‘Habsburg minister’ and that, as of today, FdI has a clear idea: ‘Perhaps the time has come to really campaign against the banks. Messina deserves credit for one thing: bringing out the Fazzolari in all of us’. In Milan, Attilio Fontana, the ‘hidalgo’, is siding with the headteachers, because their discretion is also a form of autonomy, and ‘you cannot force headteachers not to evacuate’. A brief note. News sites around the world are reporting that “Microsoft” has gone down. In Rome this evening, the news is that Calenda is apparently spreading a story about Schlein that is unfavourable to her (he is said to have mentioned Little Red Riding Hood), but “it’s not true, trust me”. A round table on false bomb alerts is being cleared away by false rumours. What better parable to describe these times?

The meeting begins at 3 pm and lasts approximately three hours, one hour longer than announced. Some, such as Riccardo Ricciardi, are smoking a cigarette whilst listening to Giuseppe Provenzano of the Democratic Party set out the Nazareno’s arguments. Also taking part in the video call are Alessandro Alfieri for the PD and the other M5S group leader, Luca Pirondini, representing the M5S. Then there are Peppe De Cristofaro and Luana Zanella from AVS. Enrico Borghi of Italia Viva is present, as is Marco Simoni – director of the Institute of International Affairs – representing Più Uno, alongside the socialist Bobo Craxi. Each participant outlines their own positions, and the joint work carried out on foreign policy is highlighted. This is no small matter, starting with Gaza, but it is still not enough. This is also evident from the statement circulated in the late afternoon by the parties in the broad coalition. There is therefore talk of “broad consensus on the need for a clear break from the Meloni government, putting diplomacy, peace, a leading European role and multilateralism back at the centre”. A formulation in which, between the lines, everyone can claim or refer to something, with a few suggestions for the final mediation: from a European envoy to a different relationship with Donald Trump’s United States, right through to a model inspired by the Helsinki Conference and Agreements. For the time being, to avoid further rifts, this will do. The participants speak of a “serious atmosphere”. The discussion is based on the mid-October resolutions tabled in Parliament ahead of the European Council, when the various factions within the broad coalition mutually abstained even on points they did not agree on. But, as is still filtering out from the Nazareno, “there remain unresolved issues”. There is also a suspicion that Conte wishes to prolong and dilute the debate, as his opposition to supplying arms to Kyiv is seen as his strongest asset in the race for leadership, especially if (in addition to Beppe Grillo’s jibes) Di Battista’s group were indeed to enter the fray. Today, not coincidentally, the former prime minister will be in Perugia for another stop on the M5S tour: ‘You pay for the war’.

The prospect of a showdown in the primaries is one that the Nazareno would like to avoid. They will be trying to do so over the coming days; discussions are ongoing, in an attempt to find a winning formula as early as next Tuesday. Beyond the statements, it will by no means be easy, and in any case the final say will rest with the leaders. Not only on foreign policy: other sticking points relate to the wealth tax, championed by AVS but which Conte finds ‘ideological’. Or on justice: the offence of abuse of office, which a section of the PD would not wish to reintroduce straight away, unlike their allies. In any case, “there is a willingness to reach an agreement on everything” is the mantra on the left. And in this regard, things may be moving forward, at least where it is easiest. Take immigration, for instance: this was the other round of talks scheduled for yesterday, attended by Franco Gabrielli, who proposed a ministry for migration policy, separate from the Ministry of the Interior. An idea that was met with “openness” and support. All eyes are now on Kyiv.

Ruggiero Montenegro