It is, however, a fact that there are currently several hundred open-cycle thermal power stations in the European Union cooled by water from major rivers, of which just over 20 are nuclear (France, with 13 power stations along its major rivers, has the highest number). But – for better or worse – the decline in output from these nuclear plants dominates the headlines. In reality, according to Energy-chart, the website maintained by the German Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Research, in July 2025, electricity demand in the European Union was 3 per cent higher than in July 2025, partly due to the high use of air conditioning. At the same time, the reduced flow of rivers had the most significant impact on hydroelectric generation, which fell by 23 per cent compared with July 2025, followed by coal and other fossil fuel generation, which was down by 6 per cent; nuclear generation, by contrast, was only 2 per cent lower than in July 2025. As for gas-fired generation, it actually increased by 7 per cent.

In short, the issue of climate change is extremely serious. Over the last 200 years, the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere has risen by 50 per cent above the highest level ever recorded in the preceding 800,000 years. And CO₂ has a very long atmospheric lifetime: it will take hundreds of years to bring concentrations back to levels close to those of the pre-industrial era. So, there is no point in harbouring illusions: even if, by some miracle, we were to reduce global emissions to zero tonight (not just the 7 per cent of the European Union), the extreme weather events we are currently experiencing – from summer droughts to autumn floods – would persist for several centuries. So, first and foremost, we must invest in adapting all our infrastructure. This includes the cooling systems of our thermal power stations. And it will require a mountain of money. All the more reason, then, to pursue emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost. So, enough of these ridiculous ideological prejudices: we need nuclear power immediately as part of an optimal electricity mix alongside hydro, solar and wind power.

Giuseppe Zollino

Head of Energy at Azione

Is the aim of taxing profits perhaps to penalise this effort, which has restored the financial soundness of the Italian banking system to levels comparable to, if not higher than, those of other European countries? Another criterion for assessment is a comparison with other productive sectors.

Based on data relating to the top twenty companies on the Italian stock market index, the profitability of other sectors – ranging from the automotive sector (Ferrari) to the energy sector (Snam), from defence (Leonardo) to plant engineering (Prysmian), the luxury goods sector (Moncler) and the services sector (Poste) – was in some cases higher than the average for banks. It is unclear why banks’ profits should be regarded as ‘extraordinary’ whilst those – of a similar magnitude – in other sectors are instead considered ‘normal’. Moreover, comparing return on capital without taking into account the cost of capital itself means ignoring the fact that the banking sector is typically riskier, if only because the very nature of banking is to take risks. This is why capital adequacy ratios are imposed.

Another argument sometimes put forward by supporters of this tax is that the banking system benefits from public guarantees. This argument is flawed. Following the reforms introduced in the wake of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, European governments can no longer intervene to bail out banks in difficulty unless shareholders – and, up to a certain amount, creditors too – are first called upon to contribute. Moreover, the European bank rescue fund is entirely financed by the banks themselves. This is precisely what makes the cost of capital for the banking sector higher than that of other sectors. The state provided guarantees on loans granted to households and businesses during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, these guarantees are being phased out over time and have mainly benefited borrowers, who would otherwise have paid higher interest rates.

Another argument used to justify taxing banks is that they have benefited from the consolidation of public finances and the improvement in the government’s credit rating. In reality, all companies in a country are affected, for better or worse, by the sovereign credit rating. In Italy’s case, the credit rating of some banks is actually better than that of the government, suggesting that the causal relationship might be the other way round.

In summary, there is no evidence that the banking sector’s profits are the result of irregular conduct or the outcome of distortions in its favour. The measure therefore appears to be discriminatory and lacks constitutional legitimacy.

The tax on banks’ windfall profits is not only unjustified; it is a mistake in economic policy. From various points of view. First and foremost, it ignores the central role of the financial sector in the economic system, which is to channel savings towards the most productive investments. A country’s growth depends on the efficiency and profitability of the financial system. If one taxes the intermediation between savings and investment, one is taxing economic growth. Furthermore, contrary to what has been claimed, the proposed tax is no longer an ‘extraordinary contribution’ or a ‘solidarity levy’, given that it is being proposed for the third consecutive year and that the revenue from this tax is being used to finance permanent public expenditure.

Finally, as with all taxes (as even the Americans have realised with their import duties), the price is ultimately paid by customers – that is, by those who put their savings in the bank and by those who take out mortgages. Put simply, the so-called tax on banks’ windfall profits is a tax on Italians’ savings and mortgages.

Perhaps it isn’t such a brilliant idea after all.

The price of diesel leaving the refinery is not simply the price of crude oil plus the industrial costs required to process it. The benchmark for the European market is the Platts index. Platts tracks daily supply, demand and trading activity on the markets and determines a price that reflects the value of diesel and other refined products. It is a market price, not a production cost. If there is a shortage of diesel in Europe, the Platts index may rise even whilst the price of crude oil falls.

The difference between the value of refined products and that of the crude oil needed to produce them is, to put it simply, the refining margin, the famous ‘crack spread’. Last March, following the new crisis in the Middle East, European margins reached around 60–80 dollars per barrel, up to four times the levels considered normal.

The reasons are well known. In Europe, over the last fifteen years, several refineries have been closed down, deemed unprofitable (!) and destined to lose market share due to the energy transition. The wars in Ukraine and subsequently in Iran have reduced the availability of Russian and Middle Eastern refined products. When available capacity becomes scarce, the price of refined products can diverge significantly from that of crude oil. Then comes distribution, and on top of the Platts price are transport, storage, biofuel obligations, stockpiles, network costs and trade margins. Finally, the state intervenes with excise duty and VAT. The price at the pump is the result of all these factors.

This breakdown helps to explain why the government’s response risks being misguided. At the end of July, the government reduced the excise duty on diesel by 14 centesimi – approximately 17 when VAT is taken into account. The measure was then extended until the end of August to bring down the price for consumers immediately. Since March, nearly 2 billion has been spent. However, a tax cut only benefits the consumer in full if the rest of the supply chain does not simultaneously adjust its prices and margins. And the initial data raise some doubts.

Comparing the week of 20–26 July with that of 27 July–2 August, the tax cut amounts to around 17 cents. Meanwhile, the raw material component rose by 5.7 cents and the supply chain’s gross margin by a further 6.2 cents. Taking only the rise in raw material costs into account, diesel prices should have fallen by around 11.3 cents. Instead, they fell by around 5.1 cents. More than a third of the tax reduction was therefore absorbed by the increase in the gross margin.

This does not necessarily mean that anyone has broken the law. It means that, when supply is inelastic, reducing a tax does not guarantee that the full benefit will be passed on to the consumer; part of it may be absorbed by mark-ups along the supply chain. Before spending any more public money on excise duties, it would therefore be useful to gain a much better understanding of how those mark-ups are formed.

And here we come to an issue of industrial policy that Italy has underestimated: refining. We have regarded refineries as part of the old fossil-fuel world, destined to be scaled back. But an energy crisis reminds us that a refinery is also a strategic piece of infrastructure. And we have sold almost all of them abroad.

The most obvious example is Priolo, Italy’s largest plant. It used to belong to the Russian company Lukoil; in 2023, it was acquired by GOI Energy, a group based in Cyprus. In May this year, Ludoil reached an agreement to bring it back under Italian control, a transaction subject to the ‘golden power’ clause. However, it is understood to have exclusive commercial and financial agreements with one of the major foreign traders.

The ‘golden power’ should not merely be used to ask who is buying a refinery. The most important question is what we want to preserve: how much production capacity, what stocks, what investments and what guarantees of supply in the event of an emergency.

The energy transition makes it inevitable that oil consumption will be gradually reduced; it makes no sense to lose refining capacity before demand for fuels has been reduced. For this reason, the government should focus on publishing Platts figures and supply chain margins, request data on production and stocks, and use the ‘golden power’ to safeguard security of supply. Because today, the bottleneck is not necessarily oil from the Strait of Hormuz: increasingly, it is the capacity to process it into diesel and petrol. And if the diagnosis is wrong, the state may spend hundreds of millions on reducing excise duties, only to discover that part of the discount never reached the pump.

On the other hand, there is a part of the former Ilva that still holds interest for entrepreneurs. These are the cold-rolling and cold-forming plants, starting with those in Genoa and Novi Ligure: facilities that produce rolled, galvanised and coated steels for the manufacturing industry. It is no coincidence that those showing interest are mainly steelmakers who are Ilva’s customers. No one seems willing to shoulder the risk of the entire operation alone, but by forming a consortium they might have an interest in preserving production capacity and strategic processes for various supply chains. It would, however, be a completely different Ilva. For decades, the group’s industrial ethos has been one of integration: Taranto produced the steel and the northern plants processed it. If the hot-rolling section disappears, that chain is broken. And this is where the most interesting questions arise. What slabs or coils will be used to feed the cold-rolling mills? Steel produced in Italy or imported? From which countries and on what terms? And above all: if the intention is genuinely to secure public funding to make the operation possible – despite the fact that the activities in question are not operating at a loss – what guarantees and concessions will be offered to the state? In short, the Italian consortium could save a significant part of the former Ilva. But its very success risks confirming the failure of the project that, for over sixty years, had justified the Taranto site: producing, in Italy from ore, the steel needed by our industry. The market seems to have already chosen what to keep. Now it is up to the state to decide what to do with the rest.

Following approval by the Chamber of Deputies and its passage without amendments through the Senate’s Environment Committee, the bill has not been included in the final days of plenary proceedings. It will be discussed again after 14 September, whilst the deadline for tabling amendments is set for 10 September. It is easy to predict that there will be numerous amendments from the opposition, which may also attempt various – though certainly not decisive – filibustering manoeuvres. 

Once the bill has been approved, the government will have one year from the entry into force of the enabling act to adopt the implementing legislative decrees. The promise is that these will be in place before the end of the year. In this regard, however, it should be borne in mind that the end of the 19th parliamentary term is fast approaching and that it is unlikely the technical deadline of early October 2027 will be met. Furthermore, the budget bill, which is about to be tabled, will also capture attention and resources. All the more so as the bill will be better equipped than expected, thanks to the flexibility granted by the European Union regarding defence and energy expenditure.

Even if everything were to go smoothly – with the implementing decrees approved during this parliamentary term – there would still be regret that the government failed to seal the deal on the return to nuclear power without going into extra time. Or rather, without even playing it. Ideally, in fact, the current majority in this parliamentary term would have succeeded not only in passing the legislation but also in tackling the almost certain referendum challenge. The outcome, to be honest, is far from a foregone conclusion. The precedent set in 2011 – the only repeal referendum to have achieved the required quorum out of the eight held this century – should, in truth, be placed firmly in its historical context, taking into account, first and foremost, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident.

Ahead of the highly likely referendum, in the current climate, the return to nuclear power will end up being swept up in the maelstrom of a heated election campaign, with the unfortunate side effect of becoming a weapon of mass distraction, as has historically been the case.

The current majority – which, in the 2022 framework programme agreement, had provided for ‘the use of energy production through the creation of state-of-the-art power stations without vetoes or preconceptions, whilst also considering the use of clean and safe nuclear power’, a somewhat vague formulation reflecting views within the coalition that are probably not entirely aligned – will have no choice but to reaffirm its commitment to implementing the regulations in the next parliamentary term. In this regard, it should, moreover, find ready support not only from the centrist group led by Calenda, Marattin and Picierno, but also from Futuro Nazionale. Nuclear energy, as it was once called, could serve as a unifying force – and, after all, that is no small matter.

The broad coalition – or whatever it may be called – will inevitably declare itself unanimously opposed – it would be difficult, for example, for Italia Viva to make a clear distinction – and commit not only to not implementing the provisions, but, to be on the safe side, to repealing the regulations that have been drafted, not without effort and with a certain indispensable cross-party consensus, even without the need for a referendum.

It should finally be clear to everyone that regulations are a necessary but not sufficient condition for an effective return to nuclear energy production in Italy. A broad, fundamental, cross-party and lasting consensus, which also widely involves ordinary people, will still need to be built. In this regard, we note that the enabling act does not provide for the establishment of an independent administrative authority for nuclear safety: the text refers to a review. It is true that, by international standards, a government agency – and thus a strengthening of the current National Inspectorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ISIN) – would suffice; however, given the difficulty in achieving consensus, it is better to err on the side of caution and ensure the body is as authoritative as possible.

The absence of natural gas presents the region with a real opportunity to turn its infrastructure deficit into an advantage, by implementing a direct transition to renewables which, it should be remembered, is driven by the need to mitigate climate change, but has been made inevitable by technological developments in the energy sector, which now make renewable sources the least expensive and least subject to geopolitical tensions. And this is where the Gordian knot that has tightened around Sardinia arises; it is not an isolated case, but the place where the moment of decision has arrived first.

Production from fossil fuels is concentrated both geographically and economically, whilst that from renewables is, by definition, distributed. The transition therefore requires profound social and economic transformations and involves local communities, businesses and workers. At national level, attempts have been made to accelerate the process through the centralisation of procedures and so-called simplification, whilst there has been a failure to improve administrative efficiency and update now obsolete regulations.

Rather than speeding up the process, this approach has fuelled the perception that decisions are being imposed from above. This concern, exploited by those with a vested interest in slowing down the transition, has encouraged the spread of the misleading equation between renewable energy and speculation, as if the companies proposing to build these plants were not carrying out the same legitimate economic activity as so many others, and as if wind and solar power plants were not infrastructure that transforms the landscape just as much as the bridges and viaducts that have always dotted our landscape.

The results? Regional Law 20/2025 declared almost 99 per cent of Sardinia’s territory unsuitable, and made the construction of industrial-scale plants virtually impossible, to the extent that, according to Terna data, Sardinia is now the region furthest from meeting its burden-sharing targets. At the same time, regional politicians across the political spectrum are calling for the island to be converted to natural gas – a choice that is harmful to the environment, costly (generating energy from gas currently costs around three times as much as from renewables), and which will prevent Sardinian industries from being competitive. The so-called ‘virtual methane pipeline’ will, once fully operational, cost Italians €285 million a year in their energy bills, representing a 9.6 per cent increase in transmission charges. Furthermore, there are calls across the political spectrum for the conversion to gas of one of the two coal-fired power stations still in operation – the Fiume Santo plant – despite Terna deeming this unnecessary.

Yet the data is clear: the future lies in the wind and sun, which the region has in abundance. A study by the Politecnico di Milano and the Universities of Cagliari and Padua indicates that a decisive transition to renewables could reduce energy costs by 40 per cent. Svimez estimates that renewable energy projects currently at an advanced stage of authorisation alone would create nearly 13,000 permanent jobs: a bulwark against depopulation and the emigration of young people.

For the energy transition to deliver its benefits across the country, it must bring about a positive transformation of the landscape, guided by sound planning that integrates energy, the environment and socio-economic development. We need to select the best projects, empower the communities hosting them, and promote an industrial policy based on supply chains through the creation of green clusters where companies can achieve the critical mass needed to be competitive. The challenge is immense and involves changes that will have a profound impact on society. There is only one way to overcome it: by working together.

Giorgio Querzoli is the scientific director of Legambiente Sardegna

Yet, at almost the same time on Tuesday, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright was taking credit on X for the results of the US military’s efforts in the Gulf regarding oil flows, writing that the weekly average flowing out of Hormuz had risen to almost 9 million barrels a day, in addition to the approximately 7 million passing through the bypasses – making a total of around 15 million barrels a day. “On Sunday alone, over 20 million barrels had left the Gulf region, exceeding the pre-conflict average,” the White House official specified. His statements, however, have been challenged by several experts. Andrea Paltrinieri, professor of the Economics of Financial Intermediaries at the Catholic University of Milan, explained to Il Foglio the inconsistencies between the secretary’s announcement and the data: “What Wright is saying is wrong. He believes there is an outflow from Hormuz of 9 million barrels, but both satellite images and Kpler’s estimates show an outflow of 3–4 million barrels a day, which is lower than the 7 million of ten days ago,” says the economist. “The problem, then, is the return flows – which producers need to clear storage facilities and receive new tankers before increasing output, ed. – which are almost non-existent. Consequently, production, particularly in Kuwait and Iraq, is struggling to get back on track. Iran, meanwhile, is subject to the US blockade. Needless to say, the Strait of Hormuz is not currently open, and the Revolutionary Guards’ protocol must therefore be followed,” says the expert. Javier Blas, an oil specialist at Bloomberg, has also pointed out that the data tells a different story from Wright’s: “The United States claims that nearly 9 million barrels of oil per day pass through the Strait of Hormuz, not counting bypass pipelines. This is well above what most tanker trackers are currently reporting, namely 4–6 million barrels per day.”

And the alternative route, even before Tuesday’s Houthi attack, was far from stable: “There is a passage through Bab el Mandeb, but it is not continuous,” says Paltrinieri. “There are days when 5 million barrels pass through and others when only 3 million do, namely when VLCCs (very large crude carriers with a capacity of around two million barrels, ed.) are attacked. But it is not just a question of flow; it is also a question of cargo.” And the deterioration in the Red Sea has been faster than official forecasts: the Short-term Energy Outlook published on Tuesday by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), which was finalised on 6 August, did not anticipate that the Houthis’ threats would pose risks of further production disruptions, given that, up until then, the intimidation of Saudi ships had not affected supply. “Saudi VLCCs therefore pass through the Suez Canal,” continues Paltrinieri, “but from there they can only transit at half load rather than full load – carrying one million barrels rather than two – and they have to take a longer route” if heading for Asia.

Global demand thus continues to be underpinned by stocks. However, since the start of the war, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), observed global reserves have fallen by 410 million barrels. US strategic reserves alone, established in 1975, have fallen to 1983 levels. The buffer that has so far prevented an even greater energy crisis is being depleted, and signs of strain are beginning to show. According to Paltrinieri, “there has nevertheless been a reprieve in recent days” thanks to the oil flows that emerged during the 30-day period covered by the memorandum of understanding – the June truce between Washington and Tehran. But at several hubs, “including Cushing in Oklahoma and Fujairah in the Emirates, we have reached ‘tank bottom’”, i.e. the bottom of the tanks. In fact, the ‘1-2’ spread between Brent and WTI has quickly returned to backwardation”: this means that oil for the nearest delivery date is once again costing much more than that for a later delivery date, a sign that the market fears a lasting shortage.

However, the US EIA’s short-term forecast sees Brent at $78 in the fourth quarter of 2026 and at $69 in 2027. The IEA, on the other hand, estimates that, should the situation ease next year, supply would exceed demand by 4.6 million barrels a day – enough to rebuild stocks by mid-2027. In any case, both forecasts are based on the same condition: that safe passage through both straits is restored.

Whilst there has been a decline in unregulated energy goods – whose prices are determined by the free market (falling from 13.3 per cent in June to 11.4 per cent in July) – regulated energy goods – whose tariffs are set by government agencies – have seen a sharp rise: from 9.2 per cent in June to 14. 8 per cent in July, representing a 6.5 per cent rise in a single month. Put simply, we are talking about electricity and gas for domestic use: these are the commodities having the greatest impact on Italian inflation. A breakdown of the Istat data paints a clear picture. According to Codacons, in fact, a 2.9 per cent rise in inflation in July (year-on-year) translates into an extra €959 (over the year) in expenditure for a typical family with two children. However, the consumer association warns that in the coming months, price rises for unregulated energy products (petrol and diesel) – which currently appear to be slowing down – will also be felt. Meanwhile, the hit will soon be felt on gas and electricity bills, fuelled by the intense heatwave that has forced Italians to keep their air conditioners running.

The (stated) aim of the operation is twofold. On the one hand, to transform computing power into a new asset class in which investors can invest. Jon Gray, chairman of Blackstone, used the example of aviation: a bank looks at the airline’s accounts but also at the value of the aircraft, which, in the event of bankruptcy, can be resold or leased to another carrier. On the other hand, the system would serve to facilitate the raising of capital for AI laboratories, start-ups and so on. One GW of computing capacity, Huang said, costs between 50 and 60 billion, figures that are not exactly easy to finance. BlackRock CEO Larry Fink has announced his intention to offer future securities to pension funds and those with excessive exposure to equities – essentially, high-credit-quality investments offering long-term returns – whilst Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon has said he is targeting a credit market backed by Nvidia’s computing power.

And so, whilst on the one hand the various platforms would encourage innovation, on the other they would cement Nvidia’s position, which is already hugely dominant, not least thanks to the creation of an ecosystem in which CUDA software – on which most AI programmes are optimised – only runs on the company’s own chips (effectively tying the entire industry to the company).

In any case, the markets reacted with scepticism and, following the initial reports in the Financial Times, Nvidia’s share price fell by more than 2 per cent. Over the past year, the company has been accused of engaging in circular finance, investing billions in clients such as OpenAI, who have purchased GPUs from Huang’s own company. And although the platforms will attract external capital and each project will be assessed independently, the core technology will remain that of Nvidia (which may offer, on a case-by-case basis and at the end of the contract, support or reimbursement for up to 25 per cent of the residual value of the GPUs). However, Nvidia releases more efficient chips almost every year, to which customers migrate, whilst the older ones are leased out but at ever-lower prices, reducing the revenue with which those who purchased the GPUs would need to repay their loans. The AI race is, in fact, rendering chips ‘obsolete’ more quickly, and Michael Burry – the investor made famous by his bet against subprime mortgages in 2008 – argues that major operators are keeping GPUs on their balance sheets for longer than they actually last, concealing costs totalling $176 billion between 2026 and 2028. On the risks, Solomon admitted: “Will the returns all be adequate? Of course not. There will be winners and losers.”

Whether it is propaganda or the introduction of a new measure to balance the books in the economic budget, it is fair to say that it is becoming common practice for the national banking system to finance the Meloni government’s fiscal policy. And the announcement in the middle of summer is too tempting an opportunity to pass up for political gain. The first time, in 2023, it was a disaster because the so-called ‘windfall profits’ tax turned into a gift to the banks. Then, over the following two years, the government took a hard line, only to reach agreements with the banks providing for the advance payment of deferred taxes (which will subsequently be recouped) and an extra half a percentage point of IRAP to be paid into the state coffers. And now we are in the fourth year. The funds – as the Minister for Infrastructure explained – could be used for security: “We would like to double the number of officers in the ‘Safe Roads’ programme.” So Italian banks, with their profits, are expected to support this government’s vision of security for Italy rather than, for example, something more neutral, politically speaking, such as economic growth. It must be said that Salvini spoke on behalf of the Lega and not of the government, so for now this is a proposal from a majority party and not a government measure, but it was enough to send the banking world into a frenzy – a reaction that was somewhat expected, though perhaps not so soon, not in this heat, which is forcing the ABI leadership to keep a close ear on the mood at Palazzo Chigi to understand what concrete measures they should expect when they return from their holidays. If a compulsory levy of 5 per cent on the profits of Italian credit institutions were actually possible on the basis of an executive decree, there would have been a collapse in share prices on the stock exchange yesterday, just as happened three summers ago at the mere announcement of such a measure. Instead, shares in the sector have remained virtually unchanged – a sign either that the market has not attached too much importance to Salvini’s words, or that it is awaiting a detailed regulation before assessing the potential impact on balance sheets.

As for the banking association, led by Antonio Patuelli, the mood is one of waiting and, for the time being, no official position has been taken, apart from reiterating that the agreement signed last year with the government is considered valid – namely, a commitment to provide multi-year contributions, without any new one-off taxes, to contribute to financial stability and economic solidarity. This commitment is perhaps considered too vague, given that a budget bill is due to be drafted in accordance with the European rules of the new Stability and Growth Pact. The League intends to request – and Salvini says he is convinced that the entire majority “will back us” – a three-year subsidy for the top 10 Italian banks, excluding smaller ones, which amounts to creating discrimination within the sector, the legal sustainability of which remains to be seen. But that is the situation, and whilst Spain is not a country to be emulated on the issue of migrants, on the issue of banks it is a model to be followed. “As for the Sánchez government,” observed the League leader, “I agree with nothing except the economic measures they have taken regarding the banks. If we were to take our cue from what Spain is doing (where the rate has been raised to 7 per cent for the largest banks, ed.) and were content with 5 per cent a year…”. Salvini emphasised that part of these profits “stems from state guarantees – and therefore from the taxpayers” – and from the “difference between interest income and interest expense”. The ball is now in the court of the government and the Minister for the Economy, Giancarlo Giorgetti, who last year described the banks’ contribution to the budget as “a duty”.

For Vannacci, the first obstacle to overcome is the “even tighter constraints on our capacity to spend on productive investments” resulting from the “disastrous signing by the Meloni Government of the new European Stability and Growth Pact” (“the Stability Pact is a bad compromise for Italy”, Elly Schlein had argued at the time). Therefore, Fn “proposes the establishment of the Sovereign Fund for National Growth as a strategic investment instrument designed to support infrastructure, energy, innovation, advanced technologies, research, venture capital and the capitalisation of Italian businesses” (“We need a €100 billion sovereign fund”, said Giuseppe Conte). Furthermore, the Futurists call for fiscal money “as a complementary instrument of economic policy”: no party today is openly in favour of such an instrument – an idea that poses obvious compatibility issues with remaining in the euro – but for a long time it has been a key policy of the Five Star Movement (as well as the League). It was the Five Star Movement, with the support of the PD, that managed to implement something similar with the transferable tax credit for the building super-bonus. It will come as no surprise to anyone to discover that incentives for renovations are also included in the Fn’s programme.

To boost employment recovery, Vannacciani’s supporters would like to “allow retirement after 41 years of actual contributions”: ‘Quota 41’ is a long-standing proposal by the Lega, but a motion by the PD (led by Arturo Scotto) in January 2026 has adopted it as its own, accusing the government of failing to uphold it and calling on it “to take steps to review the decision to raise the age requirements for retirement and to abolish the mechanism for periodic review”. To stimulate economic growth, Fn speaks of “strengthening domestic demand and national production, supporting productivity and fostering the creation of new wealth through work, enterprise, innovation and productive investment”. To this end, “industrial policy [is] an essential tool for strengthening the country’s competitiveness, economic security and productive capacity”. These are positions that are echoed exactly within the PD. Indeed, Vannacci’s supporters complain that “the only exemptions granted by a European Commission that is too subservient to Germany were those relating to expenditure on European rearmament and the Green Deal”. Similarly, in a letter to Il Foglio, Andrea Orlando and Simone Oggionni (PD) denounced the “limitations, hesitations and risks” of the new EU industrial policy, “the foremost of which is equating industrial policy with national rearmament”.

The Green Deal is the only real issue on which the divide between Fn and Campo Largo appears unbridgeable. But is it really? On renewables, Vannacci calls for “advance planning, prioritising sites already compromised or offshore solutions where these are environmentally and scenically sustainable, and stable compensation for the areas hosting the infrastructure”. This sounds very similar to what Schlein is calling for (“One of our ideas is this: to stipulate that, wherever there is a power plant, a proportion of the energy produced should go to small and medium-sized enterprises and households, with discounts on their bills”).

Perhaps the differences on environmental issues can be offset by agreement on other matters, such as aid to Ukraine, where Vannacci’s positions are the same as those of Avs and the M5S. Even on energy, the General’s proposal (“reopening the possibility of purchasing gas at favourable prices from Russia”) is the same as Conte’s. The Campo Largo coalition is struggling to hold together political figures who hold opposing views on practically everything: could it ever be a problem to welcome those who, on economic policy, are aligned and on the same page?

On 30 July, the Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and the Environment (ARERA) approved a fine of €5 million against A2A for breaching the REMIT Regulation (the European Regulation on Market Integrity and Transparency). According to the Authority, in 2022 the company engaged in unlawful conduct involving the ‘economic withholding of capacity’, with the effect of setting prices ‘at an artificial level’ – that is, higher than ‘what would have resulted from a fair and competitive interaction between supply and demand’. The decision, which also contains the regulator’s responses to the objections raised by A2A, is extremely interesting because it demonstrates just how sophisticated the debate is: beyond the technical aspects, the outcome of the inevitable legal dispute will have a massive impact on shaping the interpretation of the rules and the behaviour of market participants.

So, whilst this demonstrates an Authority that is more determined than ever, it also raises a general issue: a penalty, however severe, serves as a deterrent only if it is imposed in a timeframe compatible with the decisions of the operators. Four years is an eternity. Now then: the A2A case in 2022 had triggered a much broader investigation, covering the two-year period 2023–24. The findings were published in 2025 and documented widespread potentially unlawful practices. The problem is that the investigation is incomplete, as it relates solely to the day-ahead market. The second part, concerning the so-called dispatching services market, was due to be published immediately after the first, but has been postponed several times: on 23 July, a week before fining A2A, the Authority extended its scope, postponing its conclusion until 31 December 2028. This decision is justified, on the one hand, by the desire to investigate more recent periods as well; on the other, by the intention to assess the introduction of “an integrated regulatory framework, based on ex ante criteria for verifying bids and on systematic and timely ex post monitoring”. In the meantime, no individual proceedings have been initiated against specific companies. The contrast between the two resolutions could not be more striking. Just one week later, ARERA first postponed the conclusion of an investigation begun years earlier by more than two years; then it took a hard-line stance against a single operator. In the first instance, it cited the need to strengthen supervisory tools (including, amongst other things, calling for a substantial suspension of the market). In the second, it demonstrated that it knows how to use the tools at its disposal very effectively. What is its true nature?

Whilst in the wholesale market the problem lies in the effectiveness of enforcement, in regulated infrastructure sectors the problem is even more fundamental: competition is not even allowed to take place. On 28 July, the Italian Competition and Market Authority (AGCM) sent the government and parliament its customary report for the purposes of the annual competition law. On the subject of energy, the Competition Authority raises three issues: tenders for gas distribution, electricity distribution and large hydroelectric schemes. In principle, these tenders are already provided for by law. In fact, there is de facto bipartisan consensus in favour of continuing with the current arrangements. In the case of gas, the tenders are on hold pending an implementing decree from the Ministry of the Environment, which has been announced for at least two years but has yet to materialise: in the meantime, there is a great deal of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring to redefine the scope of the concession areas (currently 172), which would postpone their allocation indefinitely. As for electricity distribution, two years ago the government introduced an extension mechanism, but practical difficulties and the admission that the conditions were blatantly favourable to the outgoing concessionaires have brought everything to a standstill: suffice it to say that any concession fee would be paid at the start of the extension but then passed on via the tariff. Thus, a sum that formally represents the price paid to obtain the extension becomes, through the tariff mechanism, a source of revenue for the concessionaire itself. Finally, on the issue of hydroelectric power, the government has been saying for months that it wishes to negotiate a ‘fourth way’ with the European Commission, so as to circumvent the obligation to hold a tender. In all these cases, the result is the same: the failure to hold a tender prevents the true value of the concession from being determined and allows the incumbents to retain an advantage which, under competitive conditions, would be open to challenge.

The problem, therefore, is not a lack of rules. It is the reluctance to apply them when they affect established interests. Without political will and courage, competition will remain an abstract principle: celebrated in the authorities’ documents but systematically postponed when the time comes to put it to the test.

To continue claiming, as now only the trade unions and the PD do, that the (decarbonised) hot-work area is strategic for the country is to ignore reality. In Taranto, the integrated steelmaking process has not existed since December 2025, when Minister Urso’s commissioners decided to launch the so-called ‘short-term plan’ involving the shutdown of blast furnaces and coking plants. According to Minister Urso, the Italian economy is booming. But no one is going to build new plants in Taranto. One might well wonder how it is possible to have gone from the promise of “Europe’s largest green steelworks” to a service centre without so much as a murmur. In Italy, it is easier to cry ‘fascism’ than to call for jobs. Especially when it is certain that redundancy pay will be guaranteed to everyone. Italian entrepreneurs are simply doing their job, stepping in only after having eliminated all criminal, economic, environmental, industrial and political risks. There are no brave captains, only cowardly politicians.

It is regrettable, however, that the area where this major infrastructure project is due to be built is home to a very rare frog, the Alsodes pehuenche. Known as the "spiny-chested frog". “Fewer than a thousand remain in the wild,” wrote DiCaprio two days ago in a heartfelt social media appeal. “This amphibian, which is critically endangered, lives exclusively in the Pehuenche Valley, between the Chilean and Argentine Andes. Now the species faces one of its greatest threats: a binational electricity transmission project.”  The day after the post, on Monday 10 August, “the Chilean government could approve a catastrophic plan that would destroy the heart of its only known habitat”. DiCaprio’s request, he specifies, is not to halt the project, but to have it carried out elsewhere. His request has been granted, at least on the first point.

On Monday, the SEA suspended the meeting of the Evaluation Commission (Coeva) scheduled for 4 pm, concerning the project’s environmental impact assessment. At present, the official website does not state the reasons for the decision, nor is it clear when the meeting will be rescheduled. It cannot therefore be ruled out that the appeal by a Hollywood star such as DiCaprio may have influenced the course of events. For its part, Enel Chile has given assurances that it has analysed the environmental aspects and is ready to cooperate with the authorities. The authorities, however, do not appear to be showing a similar willingness to engage. On 9 July, in fact, the 20 regional councillors and the governor of the Maule region, Pedro Álvarez-Salamanca, unanimously voted to reject Enel’s project. This non-binding decision was driven by fears that the project could have a negative impact on the natural ecosystem of the Upper Maule and jeopardise the process of having the nearby Pillanmapu Geopark recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. 

On this matter, the Chilean government’s position remains ambiguous. “This social media post concerns a specific project that is currently undergoing an environmental assessment, so I cannot comment on a project whilst it is still ongoing,” said Environment Minister Francisca Toledo, referring to DiCaprio’s appeal. She went on to defend the country’s authorisation process: “Chile has a robust institutional framework for environmental matters, in which all the relevant information is assessed and weighed up for the purposes of environmental assessments.” Yet, frogs aside, the government in Santiago does not seem at all opposed to strengthening its energy links with Argentina. 

On 21 July, the Chilean Minister for Energy, Ximena Rincón, met with Jimena Latorre, Minister for Energy and the Environment of Mendoza, the Argentine province where Enel’s project is due to be built. During the bilateral meeting, the two ministers “agreed on the need to strengthen energy integration as a means of promoting economic development, security of supply and new investment on both sides of the Andes”, according to an official statement. One of the main topics discussed was the Los Cóndores–Río Diamante interconnector. According to Latorre, this project could also be complemented by the future ultra-high-voltage Río Diamante–Charlone line (in the north-western part of the province of Buenos Aires), another strategic project envisaged under the National Plan for the Expansion of Electricity Transmission. “This would therefore constitute a bioceanic electricity corridor, starting in Chile, crossing Mendoza and integrating into the Argentine backbone grid, thereby strengthening the infrastructure necessary for economic development and new investment,” emphasised the Minister from Mendoza.  “The modernisation of electricity infrastructure is essential for the development policies of both countries and the entire region. Therefore,” she concluded, “we are committed to closely monitoring progress and maintaining direct contact with all the provinces that will benefit from these projects, which will ensure the security of the binational electricity system.” 

The Los Cóndores-Río Diamante project will also be assessed separately by the Argentine authorities. And there could be far fewer hitches here (DiCaprio permitting).

According to June estimates by the Washington-based think tank Foundation for Defence of Democracies (FDD), Iran suffered losses of around $144 billion in the first few months of the war – approximately 40 per cent of its pre-war GDP – although, according to the authors themselves, the figure remains uncertain and could be as high as $300 billion. The Al Habtoor Research Centre in Cairo, which uses some of the same data, estimates instead that the economic cost to Tehran could reach around $187 billion by December. In both cases, the figures include revenue lost due to the US naval blockade as well as damage caused by air strikes on critical infrastructure not solely linked to oil, such as petrochemical complexes and steelworks. Furthermore, according to FDD analysts, Iran’s share of world trade has plummeted from 2.2 per cent to less than 0.02 per cent this year. The country is effectively isolated.

In June, as soon as the US blockade was suspended following the brief truce, oil exports had risen to $4.5 billion according to figures from United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), whilst in July they had fallen to $2.44 billion after attacks by the Pasdaran on commercial vessels prompted the United States to reinstate the blockade. However, since then, almost no loaded Iranian oil tankers have left the Gulf, except for those bound for China at a discount of $10–12 per barrel, according to UANI.

Selling oil was one of the main ways in which the regime obtained dollars to fund various allied terrorist groups in the region, but also to pay for imports of wheat, medicines and machinery, and to prop up a stronger rial. To circumvent the sanctions, Iran has built up and relied on a parallel network of currency exchange bureaux, shell companies and financial platforms, thereby creating a shadow banking system essential for converting oil revenues, which are largely received in yuan. However, in recent months, the US Treasury has repeatedly targeted this network. In July, it sanctioned both the currency exchange houses that were moving hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of Iranian banks and the front companies used to conceal the transactions. Last Friday, it was the turn of the cryptocurrency circuit, specifically Aban Tether and Shelbit, accused of transferring millions on behalf of the Pasdaran. The Treasury thus stated that the regime is “desperately seeking foreign currency”.

But the longer the blockade continues, the more the situation deteriorates. Iran’s oil sector is, in fact, buried in debt, as even officials in Tehran themselves have admitted, according to a report by Reuters. The state-owned company has had its accounts frozen for unpaid taxes, and the government has just restructured €55 billion of debt owed to banks, which is in turn covered by the Central Bank.

Printing money at the government’s request has become almost standard practice. The rial, which was already trading at 1.39 million to the dollar when fierce protests by Tehran’s traders broke out in late December, had plummeted to 1.9 million by the end of April. According to the World Bank, food inflation, a shortage of imports and falling real incomes will only serve to increase poverty. In the spring, there were nearly 800,000 more people out of work, according to Iran’s Statistical Centre, and according to Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official, only 35 per cent of the working-age population is in employment, whilst the minimum wage does not even cover a quarter of the cost of living.

As long as the state of war continues, the regime can blame everything on the external enemy, but Trump’s crackdown is exposing the vulnerabilities that the regime had already created at the expense of its citizens, through years of deficits covered by the Central Bank, under-investment and resources diverted to allied militias.

The party is calling for the ‘remigration’ of foreigners, withdrawal from the euro and a breakaway from the European Union, and an end to industrial and climate policies. Yet those two Länder need precisely what these policies risk driving away: immigrants and capital. According to calculations by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Saxony-Anhalt will lose 322,000 inhabitants by 2040 (not to mention that its median age will rise to 52.1 years, compared with the German average of 47.1). Furthermore, a study published a few weeks ago by the DIW, a Berlin-based economic research institute, estimates that the AfD’s migration policies would reduce the number of foreign arrivals in the state by between 45 and 65 per cent per year, in a part of the country – the eastern Länder – where foreign workers generate 24.6 billion euros in added value, according to the IW, the German industry research centre. A report commissioned by businesses from the ifo Institute for Economic Research in Dresden reaches a similar conclusion: with low levels of investment, a shortage of workers and an ageing population, there is a risk of falling behind the rest of the country in terms of economic growth. Indeed, all these promises made by the AfD to investors come at a price – or rather, they represent a risk. In a survey of German listed companies cited by the IW, 92 per cent regard populism as a competitive disadvantage for Germany, and 76 per cent see the rise of the AfD as a direct threat to the country’s strength as an exporting power.

All this should also give the Italian majority and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party pause for thought. Over the past three years, the markets have rewarded the government’s fiscal prudence, and the spread between BTPs and Bunds – currently at 78 basis points – remains at a 15-year low. Meanwhile, Roberto Vannacci’s Futuro Nazionale (which describes itself as “not an accountant” when asked about economic policy) holds views not too dissimilar to those of the AfD and has risen in the polls above the Lega, to the extent that only by adding its votes would the centre-right surpass the broad coalition in 2027. The lesson from Germany is that investors analyse party manifestos before the election results are known. And as long as the General remains outside the coalition, it will primarily be an electoral problem for Meloni. Otherwise, look again at the German case.